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Abstract 
 Three studies address whether people can experience collective guilt for 
present-day behavior that harms ingroup members in the future. In a correlational 
study, collective guilt mediated the relationship between perceived harm to future 
ingroup members on willingness to engage in behaviors that mitigate global warming. 
An experimental study extended these results by showing similar effects for actual 
behavior and pro-environmental attitudes. A final experiment extended the other 
studies by showing similar effects on political conservativism, particularly when 
global warming was seen as having only a minor impact. These studies suggest that 
shifting the emphasis from collective for past harm to collective guilt for future harm 
has important implications for research on collective emotions and pro-environmental 
behavior.   
 
1 
Introduction 
 Over the last decade, collective emotions research has proliferated in social 
psychology. Building upon self-categorization theory (Turner, 1999) and appraisal 
theories of emotion (Scherer, Shorr, & Johnstone, 2001), collective emotions research 
argues that a salient social identity shifts the way that people appraise and respond to 
emotionally-relevant events (Smith & Mackie, 2008). That is, a salient social identity 
elicits appraisals of events based on their relevance for the ingroup, rather than for 
individuals themselves (Smith, 1993). Furthermore, a salient social identity elicits 
responses to events that regulate collective behaviors, rather than individual behaviors 
(Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). The increased 
emphasis on collective emotions provides a useful contribution to the psychology of 
emotion, which has generally concentrated on individual determinants of emotional 
experience and subsequent behavior (e.g., individual biology or appraisals; Oatley, 
Jenkins, & Keltner, 2006).  
 One collective emotion that has received extensive attention is collective guilt 
(see Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006 for reviews). 
Like personal guilt (see Lewis, 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2007b; Weiner, 2006 for 
reviews), collective guilt is an aversive emotion that arises when people feel their self 
is implicated in wrong-doing. However, unlike personal guilt, collective guilt arises in 
response to events that are perceived as relevant for the collective self, rather than for 
the personal self. Furthermore, unlike personal guilt, collective guilt fosters responses 
aimed at regulating collective or group-based behavior (Maitner et al., 2007; Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1979), rather than personal behavior (Gross, 2007). Thus, what differentiates 
collective guilt from personal guilt is its basis in the collective self, as well as its role 
in strategies to manage the positivity of that self (e.g., Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, 
& Doosje, 1999).  
 For instance, men can feel collective guilt for gender inequalities (Miron, 
Schmitt, & Branscombe, 2006) and White-Americans can feel collective guilt when 
considering their social privileges relative to Black-Americans (Powell, Branscombe, 
& Schmitt, 2005). Collective guilt occurs regardless of whether individuals have 
directly contributed to the inequalities themselves. Collective guilt also promotes 
behaviors to remedy the group’s wrong-doing, such as apologizing or providing 
reparations to those harmed (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004)—even when these 
behaviors are relatively disconnected from relevant personal behaviors.  
 An important insight emerging from collective emotions research is that 
people’s collective identities extend across time (Giner-Sorolla, Mackie, & Smith, 
2007; Sani, 2008; see also Williams & Gilovich, 2008). People can feel collective 
emotions not only for present-day events, but also for events that occurred in other 
time periods (e.g., Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). This is particularly so for collective 
guilt—people can experience such guilt not only for their present ingroup’s wrongs, 
but also for the past ingroup’s wrongs. For instance, Dutch citizens reported increased 
collective guilt when their historical colonization of Indonesia was portrayed 
negatively (e.g., annexed land, abused/killed natives), than when it was portrayed 
positively (e.g., initiated laws, built schools; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
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Manstead, 1998). Given the flexible nature of self-categorization (Turner, Oakes, 
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), collective identity forms a link between an ingroup’s 
checkered past and its present-day members’ emotional experiences (Adams, Biernat, 
Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008).  
 Although collective emotions research has considered how collective 
identities extend into the past, it has not yet considered how collective identities 
extend into the future. This is not surprising, as emotions are typically considered as 
responses to events that have already occurred, rather than to events that have not yet 
occurred (e.g., Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008). Still, if collective identities 
do extend into the future, then it is plausible that people can feel collective emotions 
for events that are seen as likely to occur in the future. In the case of collective guilt, 
at least two categories of events could elicit this emotion: 1) considering the wrongs 
of future ingroup members or 2) considering the behavior of present-day ingroup 
members that become wrongs via their delayed or cumulative negative effects in the 
future. In both cases, collective guilt should motivate people to regulate collective 
behavior, such as attempting to forestall negative outcomes for future ingroup 
members.  
 The present research examines whether people can experience collective 
emotions in response to future ingroup wrongs. It focuses on collective guilt resulting 
from present-day ingroup behaviors that have negative outcomes in the future, and it 
does so in the context of American identity and global warming—the most pressing 
environmental concern of modern times (Oskamp, 2007). This research begins with a 
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discussion of collective guilt research, focusing on its primary findings and existing 
limitations, particularly in the context of global warming. This is next followed by a 
discussion of the connection between collective guilt and global warming. This will 
then be followed by a consideration of the controversy surrounding global warming, 
as well as the rationale behind collective guilt as a motivation for reducing global 
warming.  
Previous Research on Collective Guilt 
Primary Empirical Findings 
Several comprehensive overviews of the research on collective guilt already 
exist (Branscombe, 2004; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Wohl et al., 2006). Given that 
such reviews exist, the present review will focus on the main theoretical premises 
derived from this empirical research. As in previous reviews, this review focuses on 
factors that elicit the experience of collective guilt, as well as the effects of collective 
guilt on relevant attitudes and behavior.  
Previous research shows that two broad categories of factors are required to 
elicit collective guilt. The first broad category encompasses factors that promote the 
salience of one’s social identity (or self-categorization as a member of a social group; 
Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). When social identity is salient, it shifts one’s self-
perception from the individual “I” to part of the collective “we,” which makes the 
experience of collective guilt possible (see Turner et al., 1994). A number of factors 
can increase the salience of social identity (see Smith & Mackie, 2007 for a review). 
From the perspective of self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1994), social identity 
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salience depends on two issues—the perceiver’s readiness to self-categorize as a 
member of a social group, and the fit of a self-category to a particular social context. 
As a general rule, perceiver readiness is highest for people who strongly identify with 
a social group, and fit is highest in intergroup contexts in which social groups are 
behaving in a manner consistent with relevant group norms (Haslam, Powell, & 
Turner, 2000).  
 The second broad category of factors that elicit collective guilt encompass the 
degree of legitimacy associated with ingroup behavior (see Kelman, 2001; Tyler, 
2006 for overviews on legitimacy). Since members of social groups are motivated to 
maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1994), they 
generally perceive their ingroup’s behavior as legitimate (i.e., right, valid, correct; 
Turner, 1991, 2005). Nevertheless, when group members perceive their ingroup’s 
behavior as illegitimate (i.e., wrong, biased, error-prone), then they are motivated to 
resolve the “threat” to their social identity (Branscombe et al., 1999; Branscombe & 
Doosje, 2004; Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Turner, 1991). Resolving 
social identity threats involves attempts to justify (legitimate) the group’s behavior 
(Turner, 1991; see also Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Stangor & Crandall, 2000). 
Whether collective guilt occurs and thus motivates regulation of collective behavior 
depends on whether the ingroup can sufficiently legitimize its guilt-worthy actions.  
 Research has shown that there are at least five methods for legitimizing the 
ingroup’s behavior when faced with evidence of illegitimacy (Branscombe, 2004; 
Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; Schmitt, Miller, 
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Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008; Wohl et al., 2006). Two of these methods involve 
reaffirming the acceptability of ingroup behavior. First, ingroup members can deny 
the group’s responsibility for any harm that has occurred. When the group is not 
responsible for the harm, then ingroup members have no basis for collective guilt. 
Second, ingroup members can explain that the group’s behavior is legitimate—that it 
was grounded in sensible reasons. When the ingroup has behaved based on sound 
judgment, then ingroup members have no basis for collective guilt. 
The other three methods involve reappraising events so as to make them seem 
more positive than they might otherwise. First, ingroup members can downplay the 
severity (and presumably the likelihood) of harm done by the group. When the 
amount of harm caused by the ingroup is minimal, then ingroup members have no 
basis for experiencing collective guilt. Second, ingroup members can focus on the 
benefits of ingroup behavior, rather than on its costs. When the ingroup has produced 
positive outcomes, then ingroup members have less basis for collective guilt. Third, 
ingroup members can suggest that the group is not capable of doing anything about 
the harm—repairing the damage is too difficult or would require excessive effort. 
These claims suggest that the group has little efficacy to repair the harms (Bandura, 
2000; 2006), or the effort required outweighs its value (Schmitt et al., 2008). When 
the ingroup has limited resources (time, money, etc.) to address the outcomes of its 
behavior, this too can undermine the basis for collective guilt.  
 Although methods for reaffirming the acceptability of ingroup behavior might 
be straightforwardly related to legitimizing present-day behavior, it might be more 
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difficult to see how this is true for methods related to reappraising events to make 
them seem more positive. One might think that such appraisals are simply ways to 
realistically assess the threat to the ingroup—both degree of harm and the group’s 
resources for dealing with it (e.g., Gross, 2007; Lazarus, 1999), and nothing more. 
This implies that people’s views on what happened in other time periods are about 
what happened then, not about what is happening now.  
For instance, if European Americans experience collective guilt for harm that 
occurred to Native Americans during the colonial period, then this guilt is about what 
happened during the colonial period. However, a subtly different but crucial point is 
argued here—the collective guilt that European Americans experience today would 
be largely mitigated if the group had previously taken sufficient steps to redress the 
harms that occurred in the past. Why? Because the ingroup would have resolved its 
residual sense of illegitimacy caused by failing to address its negative past treatment 
of Native Americans—in a sense, the two groups never reconciled. Thus, European 
Americans’ present-day guilt is driven by present-day, illegitimate behavior—that is, 
their ingroup’s ongoing failure to address the negative effects of its colonial past for 
Native Americans (Branscombe et al., 2002).  
This point is essential when considering collective guilt and global warming. 
As discussed in detail later, many have denounced the evidence for global warming, 
preferring to represent the future as relatively unchanged from the present-day. These 
claims justify not changing present-day ingroup behaviors that harm the environment. 
Thus, what seems like realistic appraisals of events in other time periods are driven 
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by what ingroup members are doing (or not doing) now, not what happened (or will 
happen) then (see Halbwachs, 1992 or Moscovici, 2001 for similar arguments).  
The distinction between types of legitimizations—reaffirming acceptability 
versus reinterpreting positivity—parallels the distinction between symbolic and 
realistic threats to the ingroup (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Symbolic threats stem 
from threats to the ingroup’s values and lifestyle, whereas realistic threats stem from 
threats to the ingroup’s safety and well-being. Legitimizations that reaffirm ingroup 
acceptability seemingly resolve threats to the ingroup’s values and lifestyle, whereas 
legitimizations that reinterpret positivity seemingly resolve threats to the ingroup’s 
safety and well-being. As discussed in detail later, it is possible that these distinct 
types of legitimizations underlie distinct collective emotions. However, the present 
research conceptualizes “realistic threats” as legitimizations, and suggests that the 
distinction between symbolic and realistic threats might be problematic. Although 
perception is responsive to reality, it remains socially-mediated (Turner, 1991).  
 When ingroup members are unable to sufficiently legitimize their group’s 
behavior, then they are likely to experience collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 
2004; Branscombe et al., 2002). Since collective guilt is aversive (Miron et al., 2006), 
people are motivated to engage in collective-level emotion regulation, in order to 
restore a positive social identity (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Maiter et al., 2007; 
Mackie, & Smith, 2007; see also Gross, 2007). Such regulation may involve changes 
in one’s attitudes toward the harmed group (e.g., reduced prejudice; Powell et al., 
2005), as well as changes in behavior toward the harmed group (e.g., apologies, 
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reparations; Barkan, 2001; Doosje et al., 1998). More explicitly, given that one’s 
collective self is implicated by ingroup harm-doing, people are motivated to adjust 
their collective attitudes and behavior in order to reduce collective guilt. Generally 
speaking, reductions in the legitimacy of harmful ingroup behavior can promote 
socially-beneficial changes in that behavior.  
Limitations of Existing Research 
 Although research on collective guilt has made important contributions to our 
understanding of collective emotions, this work has three important limitations that 
are particularly relevant when thinking about collective guilt and global warming.  
The first limitation is that research has not considered the experience of collective 
guilt in the context of harms that occur in the future. A substantial body of research 
suggests that people’s perspective on the future plays a significant role in how they 
regulate their present-day behavior (Higgins & Pittman, 2008; Liberman, Trope, & 
Stephan, 2007; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Molden & Dweck, 2006; Sanna & Chang, 
2006). Nonetheless, it is important to point out that people can be wrong about how 
their present behavior will impact future events. While expediency might lead people 
to adopt favorable perspectives on how their behavior will impact future events (e.g., 
Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007), considering an unfavorable perspective on future 
events could elicit collective guilt. If so, then such guilt could elicit present-day 
changes in ingroup attitudes and behaviors that lead to a better future.   
The second limitation of collective guilt research is that it has attended only to 
harm between groups, rather than harm within groups. The reason for this focus is 
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partly historical, as the social identity perspective developed out of research focused 
on intergroup conflict (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Recent research 
based on the social identity perspective has ventured away from an exclusive concern 
with intergroup relations, to consideration of intragroup relations (Postmes & Jetten, 
2006) and alternative topic domains (e.g., education, health; Haslam, Ellemers, 
Reicher, Reynolds, & Schmitt, in press). The reason for this focus is also partly due to 
the assumption that people are not motivated to, and do not, harm their own ingroup. 
Although this assumption might be generally true, it does not negate the fact that 
people’s present behavior can have unintended consequences in the future (Merton, 
1936). This holds even for the most well-meaning of present-day ingroup members. 
Accordingly, ingroup members could do substantial harm to their group by making 
poor decisions in the present, which might only come to be seen as such in hindsight. 
Indeed, it is plausible that future ingroup members might assign blame to present-day 
ingroup members based on the foreseeable effects of their conduct on the future (e.g., 
Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006; Page, 2006).  
The third limitation of collective guilt research is that it focuses on a limited 
range of events that might provoke collective guilt—events that are sufficiently 
removed in time from the present or that are relatively rare among present-day group 
members (e.g., owning slaves, torturing natives, or murdering people based on their 
religious views). This limited range of events originates from the desire to provide 
firm evidence for the distinction between personal and collective emotions (Doosje et 
al., 1998). Such evidence is obtained by limiting research on collective emotions to 
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events or behaviors that people could not have engaged in themselves (e.g., Gordijn, 
Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Smith et al., 2007). People could not have possibly 
engaged in events before their own birth, and they are not likely to have engaged in 
events that are relatively infrequent among present group members. In both types of 
cases, people are not likely to have engaged in the behaviors, thereby substantiating 
the group-based nature of resulting emotional experiences. While researchers did not 
necessarily intend to limit the range of events that may elicit collective guilt (Doosje 
et al., 1998; see also Smith & Mackie, 2008), substantial empirical research differs 
from intentions and indeed focuses on such historical events—those that are severe, 
salient, and no longer occurring.  
Nonetheless, limiting instances of collective emotion to only events or 
behaviors that lessen the potential for experiencing relevant personal emotions is 
potentially misleading, particularly when the events or behaviors under consideration 
are commonly performed by present ingroup members. This is so with Americans and 
global warming, where the vast majority of people personally do add to the problem. 
Notice that there is a difference between the quantity of vehicle emissions that one 
American produces and the quantity that three-hundred million Americans produce, 
though both collectively contribute to global warming. In order to distinguish 
between personal and collective guilt in this instance, it is important to consider that 
self-categorization transforms the meaning of “my” vehicle emissions as an 
individual into one small part of “our” pooled emissions as a social group (e.g., 
Tajfel, 1966; Turner et al., 1994). “Our” pooled emissions as a social group serve as 
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the basis for collective guilt, regardless of a given individual’s contributions to global 
warming. Such transformation in the meaning of behavior occurs independent of the 
potential for experiencing relevant personal emotions.  
Connecting Collective Guilt and Global Warming 
The Global Warming Controversy 
 Global warming refers to the gradual buildup of greenhouse gases in the 
Earth’s atmosphere, which traps sunlight from space, thereby increasing atmospheric 
and oceanic temperatures (Dessler & Parson, 2006). According to the United Nation’s 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007), if current warming trends 
follow their present course, then global warming will have detrimental effects on the 
planet. Such effects could include increased levels of drought, disease, flooding, and 
other harms. The public’s increased recognition of global warming as an important 
social issue has been reflected in increased media coverage (National Geographic, 
2008; Time, 2007), heated political discussion (Gore, 2007), and appeals for further 
research within psychology (Oskamp, 2007; Oskamp & Schultz, 2006; Reser, 2007).  
 Despite the strong evidence supporting the existence of global warming 
processes, people have been slow to respond. An important reason behind this failure 
to respond has been the strong doubt and uncertainty consistently fostered by those 
opposed to shifting present-day behaviors related to global warming (see Dessler & 
Parson, 2006 and Michaels, 2008 for lengthy discussions). These parties generate 
uncertainty about global warming by attacking the scientific evidence in several, 
inconsistent ways: claiming that the global climate is not changing in negative ways; 
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claiming that the global climate is changing in negative ways, but that this change is 
not caused by humans; claiming that the global climate is changing, but in positive 
not negative ways; or claiming that the global climate is changing in negative ways, 
but that repairing the damage is difficult or impossible at the present time (Dessler & 
Parson, 2006). Such doubts about global warming promote a conservative approach 
which, the existing evidence suggests, could be detrimental (IPCC, 2007).  
 It is important to recognize that these claims made by parties opposed to the 
validity of global warming resemble the methods for legitimizing ingroup behavior 
used to ward off collective guilt. If the evidence for global warming is portrayed as 
unsubstantiated or benign, then this legitimization reduces collective guilt and its 
motivation for changing present-day ingroup behavior related to greenhouse gases. 
Thus, global warming is less about future reality than about restoring unquestioned 
legitimacy to present-day ingroup behavior—behavior supporting the interests of 
parties opposed to the existing evidence (often non-scientists; Michaels, 2008).  
Motivations for Reducing Global Warming 
 Researchers from a variety of disciplines have emphasized the importance of 
motivation in changing present-day ingroup behavior related to global warming (see 
Gifford, 2007; Moser & Dilling, 2007 for reviews). Countless motivations for pro-
environmental behavior have been noted, including personal attitudes and values 
(Archer, Pettigrew, & Aronson, 1992; Clayton & Opotow, 2003; Nilsson, von 
Borgstede, & Biel, 2004; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999); normative pressures (Cialdini, 
2003; Goldstein, Griskevicius, & Cialdini, 2007; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, 
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& Griskevicius, 2007); social support (Osbaldiston & Sheldon, 2003; Villacorta, 
Koestner, & Lekes, 2003); intrinsic satisfaction (De Young, 2000); knowledge 
(Seguin, Pelletier, Hunsley, & 1999); altruism (Hopper & Nielsen, 1991; Milfont, 
Duckitt, & Cameron, 2006); and many others. These motivations resemble those 
commonly discussed in social psychology (such as understanding, belonging, etc.; 
Fiske, 2003; Higgins & Pittman, 2008; Pittman & Zeigler, 2007), and undeniably 
overlap and interact in important ways (Hoffman, Gillespie, Moore, Wade-Benzoni, 
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1999). The present research does not deny the important 
role that other motivations could play in promoting the reduction of global warming, 
but rather focuses on the specific, previously unexplored role of collective emotion.  
 Collective guilt represents a particularly plausible motivation for engaging in 
behaviors aimed at reducing global warming. The reason behind this surmise lies in 
the controversy around global warming. Several of the arguments against scientific 
evidence for global warming closely resemble the legitimizations examined in past 
collective guilt research. Such legitimizations have been shown to undermine guilt, 
thus diminishing the motivation to change ingroup behaviors (Wohl et al., 2006). It 
appears plausible that such arguments are employed in order to minimize potential 
ingroup changes driven by collective guilt. Moreover, research on feeling responsible 
for environmental problems predicts engagement in pro-environmental behavior 
(Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986; Kaiser, Ranney, Hartig, & Bowler, 1999; 
Kaiser & Shimoda, 1999). Such findings seem consistent with research showing that 
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group responsibility for harm fosters collective guilt and reparative behavior (Wohl et 
al., 2006).  
 Nonetheless, other collective emotions could also motivate behaviors aimed at 
reducing global warming. One distinct possibility stemming from the global warming 
controversy is collective anxiety—dread about harm to the ingroup. Popular writers 
have drawn upon collective anxiety as a key motivator of behavior aimed at reducing 
global warming. For instance, former Vice-President Al Gore (2007) describes global 
warming as a “planetary emergency,” a threat to future generations.  
The motivational role of collective anxiety also finds support in empirical 
research. Wohl and Branscombe (2008a; in press) examined feelings of collective 
“angst” as stemming from events that are perceived as threatening the future of the 
ingroup. For instance, in one study, these authors manipulated whether residents of 
university dormitories believed that the university planned to eliminate the unique 
cultures that presently existed in their buildings, versus a control condition in which 
they read about upcoming events in the dormitories. Participants in the dorm threat 
condition experienced greater collective angst and indicated greater willingness to 
participate in a protest against the elimination of their unique culture. Collective angst 
resembles collective anxiety. It could stem from the threat that is presented by global 
warming and its consequences for the future ingroup. To the extent that this occurs, it 
could motivate action aimed at mitigating the effects of global warming.  
Despite such similarities, it is important to understand the differing reasons 
why collective guilt and collective anxiety might motivate attitudes and behaviors 
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supportive of reducing global warming. Collective guilt and anxiety seemingly differ 
in that collective guilt is aimed at promoting important gains (e.g., doing whatever is 
needed to create a healthy environment for future ingroup members), while collective 
anxiety is aimed at preventing important losses (e.g., avoiding the harsh consequences 
of global warming for future ingroup members). This seems consistent with Molden, 
Lee, and Higgins (2008) who suggest that sadness entails promotion concerns 
whereas anxiety entails prevention concerns. Sadness is comparable to guilt in that 
both involve upward counterfactuals—thoughts about how situations could turn out 
better or could be improved in the future (Mandel, 2003). Given that promotion and 
prevention focus can elicit persistence toward relevant goals (Markman, McMullen, 
Elizaga, & Mizogucki, 2006), collective guilt and anxiety could elicit actions aimed 
at reducing global warming, albeit for different reasons.  
More specifically, collective guilt motivates changes in present-day ingroup 
attitudes and behaviors so as to generate a better future for ingroup members, via the 
restoration of the natural environment—they promote ingroup change. Thus, ingroup 
members will be likely to adopt attitudes that facilitate reductions in global warming, 
such as stronger pro-environmental and politically liberal attitudes (Gifford, 2007; 
Oskamp & Schultz, 2005). Ingroup members will also be likely to engage in acts that 
promote reducing global warming, such as curtailing vehicle emissions and 
conserving energy (e.g., Winter & Koger, 2004). In contrast, collective anxiety 
motivates shifts in present-day ingroup attitudes and behaviors in order to create 
stability for future ingroup members, to circumvent the harsh consequences of global 
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warming on the future ingroup—they prevent ingroup change, by promoting ingroup 
stability. This suggests that a key difference between collective guilt and collective 
anxiety is that the former focuses more on the solution (what can be done), whereas 
the latter focuses more on the problem (what will happen). Still, neither collective 
guilt nor collective anxiety would occur unless global warming was perceived as 
potentially harmful to future ingroup members. Without harm, there would be little 
need or impetus for attitude or behavior change (Brehm, 1999; Schmitt et al., 2008). 
Given that collective guilt and collective anxiety are both plausible motivators 
of behavior aimed at reducing global warming, this research examines the role of both 
emotions. If the global warming debate is a controversy of legitimacy, then collective 
guilt should play an important role in promoting behaviors aimed at reducing global 
warming (e.g., lowering emissions, conserving energy). Furthermore, collective guilt 
should play an important role in adjusting attitudes towards reducing global warming 
(e.g., environmentalism, liberalism). In contrast, if the global warming debate is about 
realistic appraisal of threat to future ingroup members, then collective anxiety should 
play an important role in promoting attitudes and behaviors aimed at reducing global 
warming. Based on claims arising from the controversy over global warming, the 
primary focus in this research is on the role of collective guilt.  
Overview of Empirical Studies 
 The present research includes three studies that address several issues. First, 
this research examines whether people can experience collective guilt for present-day 
behavior that harms future ingroup members. Since perceiving harm has often been 
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associated with collective guilt, this research examined harm as a precursor to guilt in 
each of the studies—whether the likelihood that harm will occur as a result of global 
warming, or the severity of the harm that will occur. These different ways of looking 
at harm roughly parallel the public controversy over global warming, in which parties 
argue that global warming is either unlikely to occur, or unlikely to cause substantial 
harm (Dessler & Parson, 2006).   
Second, this research examines the legitimizations that have been found to 
diminish the intensity of collective guilt (e.g., collective responsibility, collective 
efficacy). It examines legitimizations as mediators of the relationship of perceived 
harm on collective guilt. Since the controversy over global warming is potentially 
about legitimization of present-day ingroup behavior, rather the realistic appraisals of 
the threat posed by global warming, the legitimizations closely tied to reaffirming the 
legitimacy of present ingroup behavior should represent the most potent mediators of 
the perceived harm-collective guilt relationship. This theoretical model is depicted in 
Figure 1 (secondary model).  
Third, this research examines whether collective guilt for the ingroup’s 
greenhouse gas emissions mediates the relationship between perceived harm and 
attitudes and behaviors associated with reducing global warming. It examines 
willingness to engage in five types of behaviors that are commonly considered to 
reduce global warming (e.g., lowering vehicle emissions, conserving energy), as well 
as actual engagement in relevant behaviors (i.e., requesting more information about 
global warming, taking a sticker supporting global warming reduction). This research 
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also examines changes in attitudes that are associated with reducing global warming 
(i.e., pro-environmental attitudes, political liberalism). Furthermore, this research 
considers collective anxiety as an alternative motivation for changes in attitudes and 
behaviors related to global warming. Collective guilt should continue to mediate the 
relationship between perceived harm and global warming-related attitudes and 
behavior, after accounting for collective anxiety. This theoretical model is depicted in 
Figure 1 (primary model).   
Study 1 
Study 1 employed a correlational design to examine the relationship among 
legitimizations, collective emotions, and pro-environmental attitudes and behavior. 
Participants were presented with scientific information about global warming. They 
then completed measures of legitimization (harm likelihood), collective emotions 
(guilt and anxiety), and attitudes (pro-environmental) and behaviors (willingness to 
engage in five types of behaviors) related to global warming.  
Two predictions are made for Study 1. First, perceiving greater likelihood of 
harm to future ingroup members will be associated with greater willingness to engage 
in behaviors that reduce global warming, and stronger pro-environmental attitudes. 
Second, collective guilt will mediate this relationship, even when collective anxiety is 
taken into account.  
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Figure 1 
Theoretical Models Examined 
 
Primary Model (Studies 1-3) 
 
Secondary Model (Studies 2-3) 
 
 
Note. Self-categorization is held constant throughout the studies.  
 
Legitimization 
Manipulations 
Collective 
Guilt 
Legitimizations 
Legitimizations Green Attitudes 
and Behaviors 
Collective 
Emotions 
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Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Ninety-five college students (36 men and 56 women) participated in an 
internet-based survey in exchange for credit in their introductory psychology course. 
Participants indicated that they were American citizens in a prescreen questionnaire. 
The study booklet began with a half-page, factual summary of the scientific evidence 
on global warming and its expected impact on future Americans (IPCC, 2007). This 
summary suggested that humans are causing global warming, that global warming 
could negatively impact the lives of future Americans, and that the impact of global 
warming likely will be worse in the future. The summary is presented in Appendix A 
(p. 108). Instructions within the booklet clarified the meaning of “future Americans” 
as “Americans born 50 years from now.” Participants then completed the dependent 
measures. Both the summary and the dependent measures maintained the salience of 
participants’ social identity by repeatedly mentioning “American” in the text.  
Dependent Measures  
Participants first completed a measure of the likelihood of harm to future 
ingroup members. This measure consisted of six questions (α = .94), such as “What is 
the likelihood that global warming will lead to suffering for Americans in the future?”  
Participants responded on scales ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely 
likely). The complete list of questions is presented in Appendix C (p. 111). 
Participants next completed measures of collective emotions adapted from 
previous research (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004). They first completed a 
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measure of collective anxiety. This measure consisted of four questions (α = .86), 
such as “To what extent do you feel nervous about the impact of global warming on 
Americans in the future?” They then completed a measure of collective guilt. This 
measure consisted of four questions (α = .87), such as “To what extent do you, as an 
American, feel guilty for your contributions to global warming?” Participants 
responded to both measures on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). The complete list of questions is presented in Appendix C (p. 111).  
 Participants then completed measures of willingness to engage in five types of 
green practices: reducing vehicle emissions, conserving energy, engaging in green 
household activities, paying higher taxes to support global warming reduction, and 
participating in environmental advocacy. These measures were comprised of 
questions adapted from numerous internet sources addressing global warming (e.g., 
media and education-based public opinion polls, environmental lobby groups, federal 
agencies). Questions were placed into green practice measures based on their specific 
contribution to reducing global warming (e.g., behaviors in the emission questions 
reduce global warming through their impact on vehicle emissions). The green practice 
questions were prefaced by the statement, “In order to reduce the impact of global 
warming on future Americans, to what extent would you be willing to…” This 
clarified the reason for participants’ willingness to engage in green practices.  
The composition of the green practice measures are as follows. The emissions 
measure consisted of six questions (α = .81), such as “To what extent would you be 
willing to increase the number of times that you carpool with friends or coworkers 
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(vs. drive) each week?” The energy measure consisted of ten questions (α = .82), such 
as “To what extent would you be willing to adjust the thermostat in your residence so 
that it is a little warmer than you like it during the summer?” The household measure 
consisted of seven questions (α = .81), such as “To what extent would you be willing 
to reduce your consumption of meat and dairy products?” The environmental tax 
measure consisted of six questions (α = .88), such as “To what extent would you be 
willing to support a 20¢ per gallon gasoline tax, designed to encourage people to use 
less gasoline or obtain more fuel efficient vehicles?” The environmental advocacy 
measure consisted of twelve questions (α = .94), such as “To what extent would you 
be willing to give a short presentation in an elementary school about global warming 
and how to reduce it?” Participants responded to all measures on scales ranging from 
1 (not at all willing) to 5 (extremely willing). The complete list of questions is 
presented in Appendix E (p. 114).  
Participants then completed a measure of environmental attitudes. This 
measure consisted of two questions (α = .70), including “To what extent is the issue 
of global warming personally important to you?” and “How frequently have you 
personally taken steps to reduce global warming?” Participants responded to the first 
question on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (extremely important), 
and to the second question on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always).   
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Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 The primary purpose of Study 1 is to examine whether either or both 
collective guilt and collective anxiety mediate the effects of perceived harm 
likelihood on green attitudes and practices. In order to accomplish this task, a series 
of multiple mediation analyses (with collective guilt and collective anxiety entered 
simultaneously) were estimated using the SPSS macro developed by Preacher and 
Hayes (2008). The Preacher and Hayes method differs from existing methods (e.g., 
Baron & Kenny, 1986) in two important ways. First, this method does not evaluate 
the significance of mediated effects using standard methods (Sobel, 1982) as they are 
unreliable in the context of modest sample and effect sizes. Instead, the macro 
employs a bootstrapping approach, calculating 95% bias-corrected confidence 
intervals for the significance of indirect effects. When the intervals do not contain 
zero, then a given mediated effect is significant. Five-thousand bootstrapped 
resamples were computed in all mediation analyses.  
Second, the Preacher and Hayes method does not require the significance of 
each component beta coefficient (i.e., a1 and b1…ax and bx) in order to consider a 
mediated effect significant. The significance of each beta coefficient is not considered 
evidence for mediation. Mathematically, a mediated effect is computed in a mediation 
analysis (i.e., a1 x b1…ax x bx) and this product might differ from what is implied by 
the significance of individual coefficients (e.g., a1 x b1 might be significant when a1 
and b1 are not or vice versa; K. J. Preacher, personal communication, June 10, 2008). 
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Thus, conventional approaches to mediation can elicit misleading results, particularly 
when using small samples. The present research includes individual beta coefficients, 
but confidence intervals are considered definitive for determining the significance of 
mediated effects.  
In order to simplify the presentation of results for Study 1, two tables have 
been included. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the green attitude and 
practice measures, while Table 2 presents standardized beta coefficients for the 
mediation analyses. In addition, the correlations among legitimizations, collective 
emotions, and green attitudes and practices can be found in Appendix G (p. 118).  
 Vehicle Emissions 
 
The relationship between perceived harm likelihood and willingness to reduce 
vehicle emissions was examined first. Participants who perceived higher harm 
likelihood were more willing to reduce vehicle emissions, β = .40, p < .001. However, 
when collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the equation, harm 
likelihood was no longer related to willingness to reduce vehicle emissions, β = .20, p 
= .18.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the relationship between 
perceived harm likelihood and willingness to reduce vehicle emissions was examined 
next. First, collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.08, .46). Participants 
who perceived higher harm likelihood experienced more collective guilt for their 
contributions as an American to global warming, β = .65, p < .001. Participants who 
experienced more collective guilt were more willing to reduce vehicle emissions, β =  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions,  
and Green Attitudes and Practices 
___________________________________________________ 
 
                     M              SD   
___________________________________________________ 
 
     Harm Likelihood   3.29  0.96 
 
     Collective Guilt   4.49  1.46 
 
     Collective Anxiety   4.79  1.59 
 
     Vehicle Emissions   3.54  0.79 
  
     Energy Conservation  3.30  0.67 
 
     Green Household Practices 3.73  0.73 
 
     Environmental Taxes  2.28  0.99 
 
     Environmental Advocacy  2.95  1.00 
 
     Environmental Attitudes  2.93  0.87 
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
.37, p < .01. Second, collective anxiety was not a significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.31, 
.24).  
Energy Conservation 
The relationship between perceived harm likelihood and willingness to 
conserve energy was examined first. Participants who perceived higher harm 
likelihood were more willing to conserve energy, β = .48, p < .001. However, when 
collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the equation, harm 
likelihood was no longer related to willingness to conserve energy, β = .12, p = .39.  
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Table 2 
 
Standardized Beta Coefficients for Mediations of Collective Emotions on Green 
Attitudes and Practices 
XÆM  MÆY  XÆY1  XÆY2  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Vehicle Emissions 
     Collective Guilt  .65***  .37**  .40***  .20 
     Collective Anxiety  .77***            -.05   ---   --- 
 
Energy Conservation 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .29*  .48***  .12 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .22   ---   --- 
 
Green Household Practices 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .31*  .46***  .29* 
     Collective Anxiety   ---            -.05   ---   --- 
 
Environmental Taxes 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .32*  .34**            -.10 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .30   ---              --- 
 
Environmental Advocacy 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .34**  .46*            -.02 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .33*   ---              --- 
 
Environmental Attitudes 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .48***  .57***             .18 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .11   ---              --- 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. XÆM = harm likelihood on mediator; MÆY = mediator on green practice; 
XÆY1 = harm likelihood on green practice excluding mediators; XÆY2 = harm 
likelihood on green practice including mediators.  
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the relationship between 
perceived harm likelihood and willingness to conserve energy was examined next.  
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First, collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.04, .36). Participants who 
perceived higher harm likelihood experienced more collective guilt for their 
contributions as an American to global warming, β = .65, p < .001. Participants who 
experienced more collective guilt were more willing to conserve energy, β = .29, p < 
.05. Second, collective anxiety was not a significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.02, .37).   
Green Household Practices 
The relationship between perceived harm likelihood and willingness to engage 
in green household practices was examined first. Participants who perceived higher 
harm likelihood were more willing to engage in green household practices, β = .46, p 
< .001. However, when collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the 
question, harm likelihood was no longer related to willingness to engage in green 
household practices, β = .19, p = .18.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the relationship between 
perceived harm likelihood and willingness to engage in green household practices 
was examined next. First, collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.07, 
.38). Participants who perceived higher harm likelihood experienced more collective 
guilt for their contributions as an American to global warming, β = .65, p < .001. 
Participants who experienced more collective guilt were more willing to engage in 
green household practices, β = .31, p < .05. Second, collective anxiety was not a 
significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.22, .15).  
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Environmental Taxes 
The relationship between perceived harm likelihood and willingness to pay 
environmental taxes was examined first. Participants who perceived higher harm 
likelihood were more willing to pay environmental taxes, β = .34, p < .001. However, 
when collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the equation, harm 
likelihood was no longer related to willingness to pay environmental taxes, β = -.10, p 
= .48.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the relationship between 
perceived harm likelihood and willingness to pay environmental taxes was examined 
next. First, collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.05, .38). Participants 
who perceived higher harm likelihood experienced more collective guilt for their 
contributions as an American to global warming, β = .65, p < .001. Participants who 
experienced more collective guilt were more willing to pay environmental taxes, β = 
.33, p < .05. Second, collective anxiety was not a significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.01, 
.49).  
Environmental Advocacy 
The relationship between perceived harm likelihood and willingness to engage 
in environmental advocacy was examined first. Participants who perceived higher 
harm likelihood were more willing to engage in environmental advocacy, β = .46, p < 
.001. However, when collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the 
equation, harm likelihood was no longer related to willingness to engage in 
environmental advocacy, β = -.14, p = .89.  
 30
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the relationship between 
perceived harm likelihood and willingness to engage in environmental advocacy was 
examined next. First, collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.11, .37). 
Participants who perceived higher harm likelihood experienced more collective guilt 
for their contributions as an American to global warming, β = .65, p < .001. 
Participants who experienced more collective guilt were more willing to engage in 
environmental advocacy, β = .34, p < .01. Second, collective anxiety was also a 
significant mediator, CI.95 = (.06, .50). Participants who perceived higher harm 
likelihood experienced more collective anxiety for harm done to future ingroup 
members, β = .77, p < .001. Participants who experienced more collective anxiety 
were more willing to engage in environmental advocacy, β = .33, p < .05. 
Environmental Attitudes 
The relationship between perceived harm likelihood and environmental 
attitudes was examined first. Participants who perceived higher harm likelihood 
expressed stronger pro-environmental attitudes, β = .57, p < .001. However, when 
collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the equation, harm 
likelihood was no longer related to pro-environmental attitudes, β = .18, p = .14.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the relationship between 
perceived harm likelihood and pro-environmental attitudes was examined next. First, 
collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.18, .47). Participants who 
perceived higher harm likelihood experienced more collective guilt for their 
contributions as an American to global warming, β = .65, p < .001. Participants who 
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experienced more collective guilt expressed stronger pro-environmental attitudes, β = 
.48, p < .001. Second, collective anxiety was not a significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.10, 
.27).  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 provide support for the notion that people can feel 
collective guilt in response to present-day behaviors that potentially harm future 
ingroup members. As expected, increased likelihood of harm to future ingroup 
members was associated with increased levels of collective guilt. This is consistent 
with previous research showing that increased severity of harm can elicit increased 
collective guilt, particularly when the harm occurs to those categorized as ingroup 
members (e.g., Branscombe & Miron, 2004). Feeling collective guilt for future harm 
is perhaps most common for harm stemming from the unintended consequences of 
present-day behaviors, which seems particularly likely to befall ingroup members.  
 Furthermore, increased likelihood of harm to future ingroup members was 
associated with increased willingness to engage in the behaviors aimed at reducing 
global warming and on environmental attitudes. Collective guilt mediated this 
relationship—for all five types of behaviors, as well as pro-environmental attitudes. 
This suggests that the perceived likelihood of harm to future ingroup members affects 
green attitudes and practices via collective guilt for the ingroup’s contributions to 
greenhouse gas emissions. The mediating role of collective guilt held even when 
collective anxiety was accounted for in the analyses. In contrast, collective anxiety 
mediated the effects on only environmental advocacy. These results seem consistent 
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with past research on collective guilt showing that it motivates changes in behavior 
(e.g., apologies or reparations) and attitudes (e.g., reduced racism) in response to 
harm caused by the ingroup. This study also offers initial evidence that collective 
guilt might be useful in motivating attitudes and behaviors that promote reducing 
global warming.   
The present study also provides some evidence against a negative state relief 
interpretation of the findings (see Batson, Ahmad, Powell, & Stocks, 2008 for a 
review). Given that collective guilt played a broader mediating role than collective 
anxiety, it is unlikely that participants simply experienced a general negative affective 
state (as it would presumably be reflected on both emotion measures) that elicited 
changes in global warming-related attitudes and behaviors. Differential emotion, 
rather than undifferentiated negativity, seemed to be primary in the present research.  
 Based on existing research, it is interesting that collective anxiety did not have 
a broader association with attitudes and behaviors related to reducing global warming. 
One potential explanation for the absence of this result is that collective anxiety is 
more likely to occur when the negative outcome is less psychologically distant in 
time (see Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007 for a review). That is, the prevention 
focus implied in collective anxiety is to reduce impending harm to the future ingroup. 
However, in the present study, harm is defined as occurring to Americans in fifty 
years. This makes the harm less psychologically immediate than if the harm were to 
occur to Americans in twenty years. Although the relationships between prevention 
and promotion focus, collective emotions, and time as psychological distance are 
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beyond the purposes and scope of the present investigation, this research examined 
the issue in one small way. In Study 2, the definition of future Americans was 
changed from fifty to twenty years, which should bolster any effects of collective 
anxiety. 
 The results of Study 1 have at least three important limitations. The first 
limitation is the use of a correlational design. Although the hypotheses have a clear 
directional order, definitive conclusions about the direction of causality cannot be 
drawn given the nature of these data. It is certainly possible that alternative causal 
orders or potentially important variables need to be accounted for to fully understand 
the results. There are reasons to doubt some of these alternative interpretations on the 
basis of previous theory and measurement order, but the general point remains valid. 
Study 2 moves beyond this limitation by employing an experimental design.  
 The second limitation concerns the construct validity of the collective guilt 
measure. Although the measure was derived from previous research (Branscombe et 
al., 2004), it is possible that the measure did not actually capture collective guilt, but 
rather personal guilt. This potential issue stems from whether participants focused on 
the part of the measure that read “as an American” or “my contributions”—the former 
appears more collective, whereas the latter appears more individual. This potentially 
ambiguous wording is corrected in Study 2, where a new measure of collective guilt 
is employed.  
 The final limitation of Study 1 is that the green practice measures assess only 
willingness to engage in behavior, not actual behavior. Research has long shown that 
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there is a difference between experiencing the motivation to engage in behavior, and 
actual behavior (Kruglanski & Higgins, 2007). Moreover, researchers have repeatedly 
called for increased attention to measuring actual behavior, rather than simply using 
self-reports (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007). Thus, the role of collective guilt in 
motivating green practices would seem more compelling if people engaged in bona 
fide behavior following this emotional experience. As a result, Study 2 includes two 
measures that move collective guilt research toward investigating actual behavior.  
Study 2 
Study 2 employed an experimental design to examine the effects of perceived 
ingroup stability and change. Recall that if the ingroup is likely to remain the same in 
the future (e.g., in terms of values, lifestyles, institutions; Sani, 2008) despite global 
warming, then this reduces the urgency for addressing global warming. The effects of 
perceived ingroup stability and change are examined for legitimizations, collective 
emotions, and attitudes and behaviors associated with global warming reduction.  
Since the global warming debate involves a question about whether the lives 
of future ingroup members will be different with global warming, even when faced 
with clear evidence that they will be different, the present study manipulated general 
perceptions of ingroup stability and change before presenting the scientific evidence 
about global warming. These perceptions of stability and change were not explicitly 
connected to the effects of global warming, but rather were about the ingroup more 
generally. Participants then completed measures of legitimizations (likelihood of 
harm to the future ingroup, and collective legitimacy, responsibility, and efficacy), 
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collective emotions (guilt and anxiety), and green attitudes and practices (including 
an opportunity to request additional information about global warming, as well as to 
to take a sticker in support of reducing global warming).  
Three predictions are made for Study 2. First, perceived ingroup stability will 
weaken willingness to engage in behaviors that mitigate global warming, engagement 
in such behaviors, and pro-environmental attitudes. When people see their ingroup’s 
future as comparable to its present, this will lead them to discount the consequences 
of global warming for the future ingroup—that is, perceiving stability for the future 
ingroup legitimizes present-day ingroup behaviors that contribute to global warming. 
Second, collective guilt will mediate the effects of perceived ingroup stability and 
change on pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors, even when collective anxiety is 
accounted for. When the future is going to remain the same for the ingroup, then its 
present greenhouse gas emissions will seem legitimate, mitigating collective guilt.  
Third, legitimizations tied to reaffirming the acceptability of present ingroup 
behavior (collective legitimacy, collective responsibility) will most strongly mediate 
the effects of perceived ingroup stability on collective guilt. This follows from the 
suggestion that the global warming controversy is more about the legitimization of 
present ingroup practices than it is about realistic appraisal of the threat that global 
warming poses for future ingroup members. If global warming debates are about 
legitimization rather than real threat, then increased perceptions of ingroup stability 
on reductions in green attitudes and practices will be mediated by decreased 
responsibility for the negative effects of global warming and increased legitimacy of 
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ingroup greenhouse emissions. That is, if the future is going to be largely the same, 
then there is little to feel responsible for, and polluting the planet’s atmosphere is 
acceptable—the need and impetus for reducing global warming is diminished.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
One-hundred and thirty-three college students (75 men and 58 women) 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Participants indicated their 
American citizenship in a prescreen questionnaire. They completed the study in 
groups of no more than twelve participants. A research assistant informed participants 
that the study was about “different aspects of American society” and handed them a 
printed booklet drawn from a previously randomized pile. The first page of the 
booklet manipulated perceptions of stability or change in the future ingroup. In the 
stability condition, participants were asked to describe three important similarities 
between present-day and future Americans. That is, they were asked to state how life 
will be the same for Americans in the future. In the change condition, participants 
were asked to describe three important differences. That is, they were asked to state 
how life will be different for Americans in the future. In a control condition, the 
booklets did not contain a manipulation page. The instructions specified the meaning 
of future Americans as “Americans in 20 years.” Afterwards, participants completed 
a check on the manipulation.  
 Following the manipulation check on perceived ingroup stability and change, 
participants read the factual summary about global warming and its consequences for 
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future Americans from Study 1. Participants then completed the dependent measures. 
As in Study 1, booklets maintained the salience of participants’ social identity by 
repeatedly mentioning “American” in the text. When participants completed their 
booklets, they handed them to the research assistant. The assistant then administered 
the behavioral measures. Participants received a debriefing statement as they left the 
room. Three participants (two men and one woman) were excluded from the analyses 
as they did not finish a significant portion of their booklets.  
Dependent Measures 
Participants first completed a manipulation check on perceived stability and 
change. This measure consisted of two questions (α = .78) that asked “How similar do 
you think Americans today and Americans in the future will be to each other?” and 
“How different do you think Americans today and Americans in the future will be to 
each other?” The latter question was reverse-coded. Participants responded on scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). They then completed the measure of 
likelihood of harm to future ingroup members from Study 1 (α = .94).  
Participants then completed measures of collective emotions. They first 
completed the measure of collective anxiety from Study 1 (α =.93). Participants next 
completed a new measure of collective guilt. This measure consisted of four 
questions (α = .92), such as “To what extent do you feel guilty that Americans today 
contribute to greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming 
electricity, and in other ways)?” See Appendix D (p. 113) for the full collective guilt 
measure. Participants responded on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
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(strongly agree). They then completed the five measures of willingness to engage in 
green practices from Study 1: vehicle emissions (α = .85); energy conservation (α = 
.91); green household practices (α = .87); paying environmental taxes (α = .87); and 
engaging in environmental advocacy (α = .94). 
 Participants next completed three new legitimization measures. First, they 
completed a measure of collective responsibility. This measure consisted of three 
questions (α = .94), such as “To what extent do you believe that Americans today are 
largely responsible for the effects of global warming?” Second, participants 
completed a measure of the legitimacy of ingroup behavior. This measure consisted 
of three questions (α = .90), such as “To what extent do you believe it is wrong that 
Americans today contribute to greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, 
consuming electricity, and in other ways)?” Third, participants completed a measure 
of collective efficacy. This measure consisted of four questions (α = .99), such as “To 
what extent do you believe that if Americans today worked together, then they could 
reduce the impact of global warming on Americans in the future?” See Appendix C 
(p. 111) for a complete list of questions. Participants responded to these three 
measures on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The 
legitimizations were measured after collective guilt, rather than before, due to 
concerns that they might foster reactivity or suspicion. Participants then completed 
the measure of environmental attitudes from Study 1 (α = .79).  
 Once participants completed their booklets, they approached the research 
assistant sitting at a table in the front of the lab room. As each participant handed in 
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their booklet, the assistant asked the participant whether they were interested in 
taking a sticker to support reducing global warming. The sticker was two inches in 
diameter, in the shape of an octagon, with a dark green background and white letters. 
It simply read “Stop Global Warming!” The assistant subtly recorded the participant’s 
behavioral choice—to take the sticker or not—on their booklet. After the participant 
made this choice, the assistant then asked if they were interested in signing up to 
receive an email from the researchers containing more information about global 
warming. Participants wrote their email addresses on a signup sheet that was later 
used to match emails to participants using the departmental research system. All 
email addresses provided were successfully matched to participants.  
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 Study 2 was designed to examine whether collective emotions mediated the 
effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on green attitudes and behaviors, as 
well as whether legitimizations mediated the effects of ingroup stability and change 
on collective guilt. To examine these issues, analysis of variance was conducted on 
all measures except the behavioral measures (sticker and email), for which logistic 
regression was conducted. Afterwards, mediation analyses were conducted using the 
procedures outlined in Study 1, with one exception. The Preacher and Hayes (2008) 
macro cannot be used with dichotomous outcome measures. Thus, the mediations for 
the behavioral measures employ a different approach for obtaining the bootstrapped 
confidence intervals (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993; Selig & Preacher, 2008). For the 
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mediation analyses, the manipulation of ingroup stability and change was coded 
stability = 0 and change = 1, while the behavioral measures were coded as did not 
perform behavior = 0 and did perform behavior = 1.  
In order to simplify the presentation of results for Study 2, two tables have 
been included. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the green attitude and 
practice measures, while Table 4 presents standardized beta coefficients for the 
mediation analyses. In addition, the correlations among legitimizations, collective 
emotions, and green attitudes and practices can be found in Appendices H-I (pp. 120-
122).  
Manipulation Check 
Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on the 
manipulation check were examined using a one-way ANOVA. The main effect of 
ingroup stability was significant, F(2, 126) = 8.88, p < .001. Participants in the 
stability condition perceived more similarity between the present-day and future 
ingroup (M = 3.45, SD = 0.60) than those in the control condition (M = 2.91, SD = 
0.73), p < .001 or the change condition (M = 3.04, SD = 0.57), p < .01. Perceived 
similarity between the present-day and future ingroup did not differ among 
participants in the control and change conditions, p = .35. When the present and 
future ingroup are similar, this suggests that the ingroup will remain largely the same 
in the future.  
The absence of a difference between the control and change conditions is not 
surprising, as people are likely to assume that the future will be different than the 
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present (Perkins, 2001). Indeed, the control and change conditions did not differ on 
any of the dependent measures. Given these results, the control and change conditions 
were collapsed in order to examine their effects relative to the stability condition. The 
“change condition” will now refer to the collapsed control and change condition. As 
suggested earlier, when the ingroup’s way of life will remain stable into the future, 
then there is little need for reducing global warming. However, when the ingroup’s 
way of life will change in future, there is more need for reducing global warming.  
Legitimizations for Present Ingroup Behavior 
Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
legitimizations for present-day ingroup behavior were examined using a one-way 
ANOVA. First, the legitimizations that attempt to reaffirm the acceptability of 
ingroup behavior were examined. For collective responsibility, the main effect of 
ingroup stability and change was significant, F(1, 128) = 5.38, p < .05.  Participants 
in the change condition perceived more collective responsibility for the effects of 
global warming (M = 4.57, SD = 1.48) than those in the stability condition (M = 3.92, 
SD = 1.56). For legitimacy, the main effect of ingroup stability and change was 
significant, F(1, 128) = 7.69, p < .01. Participants in the change condition perceived 
that the ingroup’s greenhouse gases were less legitimate (M = 3.33, SD = 1.26) than 
those in the stability condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.53).  
Second, the legitimizations that involve portraying global warming in a 
positive manner were examined. For harm likelihood, the main effect of ingroup 
stability and change was significant, F(1, 128) = 5.39, p < .05. Participants in the  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green Attitudes 
and Practices by Perceived Ingroup Stability and Change 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Ingroup Stability     Ingroup Change 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                    M              SD              M   SD 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Legitimizations 
     Harm Likelihood  2.93a  1.00  3.33b  0.88  
     Collective Responsibility 3.92a  1.56  4.57b  1.48 
     Collective Legitimacy 4.03a  1.53  3.33b  1.26 
     Collective Efficacy 5.59a  1.47  5.96a  1.22 
 
Collective Emotions 
     Collective Guilt  3.75a  1.52  4.56b  1.47 
     Collective Anxiety  4.26a  1.69  4.88b  1.36 
 
Green Attitudes and Practices 
     Vehicle Emissions  3.20a  0.96  3.56b  0.84                 
     Energy Conservation 3.04a  0.84  3.36b  0.87                 
     Household Practices 3.31a  0.93  3.64b  0.77                 
     Environmental Taxes 1.97a  0.95  2.19a  0.93                 
     Environmental Advocacy 2.66a  0.95  3.07b  0.92                 
     Environmental Attitudes 2.57a  0.92  3.00b  0.94               
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Means in rows with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05. 
 
 
ingroup change condition perceived more harm likelihood (M = 3.33, SD = 0.88) than 
those in the stability condition, (M = 2.93, SD = 1.00). For collective efficacy, the 
main effect of ingroup stability and change was not significant, F(1, 128) = 2.35, p = 
.13. 
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Motivations for Reducing Global Warming 
Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on collective 
emotions were examined using a one-way ANOVA. For collective guilt, the main 
effect of ingroup stability and change was significant, F(1, 128) = 8.52, p < .01. 
Participants in the change condition experienced more collective guilt about 
Americans’ contributions to greenhouse gas emissions (M = 4.56, SD = 1.47) than 
those in the stability condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.52). For collective anxiety, the main 
effect of ingroup stability and change was significant, F(1, 128) = 5.12, p < .05. 
Participants in the change condition experienced more collective anxiety about future 
ingroup harm (M = 4.88, SD = 1.36) than those on the stability condition (M = 4.26, 
SD = 1.69).  
Mediation analysis. The effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on 
collective guilt were examined first. Participants in the ingroup change condition 
experienced more collective guilt than those in the stability condition, β = .53, p < 
.01. However, when the four legitimizations were included as mediators in the 
equation, ingroup stability and change was no longer related to collective guilt, β = 
.16, p = .21. 
Whether legitimizations for present ingroup behavior mediated the effects of 
ingroup stability and change on collective guilt was examined next. First, the 
mediating role of legitimizations that reaffirm the acceptability of present ingroup 
behavior was examined. Collective responsibility was a significant mediator, CI.95 = 
(.02, .26). Participants in the ingroup change condition felt more collective 
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responsibility for the harm done to future ingroup members by global warming than 
those in the stability condition, β = .43, p < .05. Participants who felt more collective 
responsibility experienced more collective guilt, β = .26, p < .01. Legitimacy was also 
a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.04, .34). Participants in the ingroup change condition 
perceived ingroup greenhouse gas emissions as less legitimate than those in the 
stability condition, β = -.50, p < .01. Participants who perceived ingroup greenhouse 
gas emissions as less legitimate experienced more collective guilt, β = .30, p < .001.  
Second, the mediating role of legitimizations that portray global warming in a 
positive manner was examined. Harm likelihood was not a significant mediator, CI.95 
= (-.16, .01), nor was collective efficacy, CI.95 = (-.19, .01). 
Vehicle Emissions 
Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to reduce vehicle emissions were examined using a one-way ANOVA. 
Participants in the ingroup change condition expressed greater willingness to reduce 
vehicle emissions (M = 3.56, SD = 0.85) than those in the stability condition (M = 
3.20, SD = 0.96), F(1, 128) = 4.94, p < .05.  
Mediation analysis. The effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to reduce vehicle emissions were examined first. Participants in the 
ingroup change condition expressed greater willingness to reduce vehicle emissions 
than those in the stability condition, β = .37, p < .05. However, when collective guilt 
and anxiety were included as mediators in the equation, ingroup stability and change 
was no longer related to willingness to reduce vehicle emissions, β = -.13, p = .44.  
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Table 4 
Standardized Beta Coefficients for Mediations of Collective Emotions on Green 
Attitudes and Practices 
XÆM  MÆY  XÆY1  XÆY2  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Vehicle Emissions 
     Collective Guilt  .53**  .21  .37*            -.13 
     Collective Anxiety  .41*             .31**   ---   --- 
 
Energy Conservation 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .27*  .37*            -.10 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .32**   ---   --- 
 
Green Household Practices 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .22*  .39*            -.10 
     Collective Anxiety   ---             .42***   ---   --- 
 
Environmental Advocacy 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .25**  .43*            -.08 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .52***   ---              --- 
 
Environmental Attitudes 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .27**  .45*             .11 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .50***   ---              --- 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. XÆM = harm likelihood on mediator; MÆY = mediator on green attitude or 
practice; XÆY1 = harm likelihood on green attitude or practice excluding mediators; 
XÆY2 = harm likelihood on green attitude or practice including mediators.   
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of ingroup stability 
and change on willingness to reduce vehicle emissions was examined next. Collective 
guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.02, .31). Participants in the ingroup change 
condition experienced more collective guilt for Americans’ greenhouse gas emissions 
than those in the stability condition, β = .53, p < .01. Participants who experienced 
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more collective guilt did not report greater willingness to reduce vehicle emissions, β 
= .21, p = .07. Collective anxiety was also a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.01, .33). 
Participants in the ingroup change condition experienced more collective anxiety 
about future ingroup harm than those in the stability condition, β = .41, p < .05. 
Participants who experienced more collective anxiety expressed greater willingness to 
reduce vehicle emissions, β = .31, p < .01. 
Energy Conservation 
Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to conserve energy were examined using a one-way ANOVA. 
Participants in the ingroup change condition expressed greater willingness to 
conserve energy (M = 3.36, SD = 0.87) than those in the stability condition (M = 3.04, 
SD = 0.84), F(1, 128) = 4.17, p < .05. 
Mediation analysis. The effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to conserve energy were examined first. Participants in the ingroup 
change condition expressed greater willingness to conserve energy than those in the 
stability condition, β = .37, p < .05. However, when collective guilt and anxiety were 
included as mediators in the equation, ingroup stability and change was no longer 
related to willingness to conserve energy, β = -.10, p = .53.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of ingroup stability 
and change on willingness to conserve energy was examined next. Collective guilt 
was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.03, .36). Participants in the ingroup change 
condition experienced more collective guilt for Americans’ greenhouse gas emissions 
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than those in the stability condition, β = .53, p < .01. Participants who experienced 
more collective guilt expressed greater willingness to conserve energy, β = .27, p < 
.05. Collective anxiety was also a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.02, .35). Participants 
in the ingroup change condition experienced more collective anxiety about future 
ingroup harm than those in the stability condition, β = .41, p < .05. Participants who 
experienced more collective anxiety expressed greater willingness to reduce vehicle 
emissions, β = .32, p < .01. 
Green Household Practices 
Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to engage in green household practices were examined using a one-way 
ANOVA. Participants in the ingroup change condition expressed greater willingness 
to engage in green household practices (M = 3.64, SD = 0.77) than those in the 
stability condition (M = 3.31, SD = 0.93), F(1, 127) = 4.49, p < .05. 
Mediation analysis. The effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to engage in green household practices were examined first. Participants 
in the ingroup change condition expressed greater willingness to engage in green 
household practices than those in the stability condition, β = .39, p < .05. However, 
when collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the equation, ingroup 
stability and change was no longer related to willingness to engage in green 
household practices, β = -.10, p = .51.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of ingroup stability 
and change on willingness to engage in green household practices was examined 
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next. Collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.02, .30). Participants in the 
ingroup change condition experienced more collective guilt for Americans’ 
greenhouse gas emissions than those in the stability condition, β = .53, p < .01. 
Participants who experienced more collective guilt expressed greater willingness to 
engage in green household practices, β = .22, p < .05. Collective anxiety was also a 
significant mediator, CI.95 = (.03, .41). Participants in the ingroup change condition 
experienced more collective anxiety about future ingroup harm than those in the 
stability condition, β = .41, p < .05. Participants who experienced more collective 
anxiety expressed greater willingness to engage in green household practices, β = .42, 
p < .001. 
Environmental Taxes 
 Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to pay environmental taxes were examined using a one-way ANOVA. 
The main effect of ingroup stability and change was not significant, F(1, 128) = 1.65, 
p = .20. Participants in the ingroup change condition (M = 2.19, SD = 0.93) did not 
express greater willingness to pay environmental taxes than those in the stability 
condition (M = 1.97, SD = 0.95). For this reason, mediation analysis was not 
conducted for this measure.  
Environmental Advocacy 
 Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to engage in environmental advocacy were examined using a one-way 
ANOVA. Participants in the ingroup change condition expressed greater willingness 
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to engage in environmental advocacy (M = 3.07, SD = 0.92) than those in the stability 
condition (M = 2.66, SD = 0.95), F(1, 128) = 5.67, p < .05. 
Mediation analysis. The effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on 
willingness to engage in environmental advocacy were examined first. Participants in 
the ingroup change condition expressed greater willingness to engage in 
environmental advocacy than those in the stability condition, β = .43, p < .05. 
However, when collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the 
equation, ingroup stability and change was no longer related to willingness to engage 
in environmental advocacy, β = -.08, p = .52.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of ingroup stability 
and change on willingness to engage in environmental advocacy was examined next. 
Collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.04, .32). Participants in the 
ingroup change condition experienced more collective guilt for Americans’ 
greenhouse gas emissions than those in the stability condition, β = .53, p < .01. 
Participants who experienced more collective guilt expressed greater willingness to 
engage in environmental advocacy, β = .25, p < .01. Collective anxiety was also a 
significant mediator, CI.95 = (.03, .45). Participants in the ingroup change condition 
experienced more collective anxiety about future ingroup harm than those in the 
stability condition, β = .41, p < .05. Participants who experienced more collective 
anxiety expressed greater willingness to engage in environmental advocacy, β = .52, p 
< .001. 
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Sticker Preference 
Logistic regression analysis. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
sticker preference were examined using logistic regression. The main effect of 
ingroup stability and change was not significant, Wald χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .91. 
Participants in the ingroup change condition were not more likely to take the sticker 
advocating global warming reduction (f = 42.9%) than were those in the stability 
condition (f = 41.9%). Thus, mediation analysis was not conducted for this measure.  
Email Preference 
 Logistic regression analysis. The effects of ingroup stability and change on 
email preference were examined using logistic regression. Participants in the ingroup 
change condition were more likely to sign-up for additional information about global 
warming (f = 60.5%) than those in the stability condition (f = 40.9%), Wald χ2(1) = 
4.40, p < .05. 
Mediation analysis. The effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on 
email preference were examined first. Participants in the ingroup change condition 
were 19.0% more likely to sign-up for additional information about global warming 
than those in the stability condition, Wald χ2(1) = 4.40, p < .05. However, when 
collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the equation, participants in 
the ingroup change were only 10.2% more likely to sign-up for additional information 
about global warming than those in the stability condition, Wald χ2(1) = 1.01, p = .32.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of ingroup stability 
and change on email preference was examined next. Collective guilt was a significant 
 51
mediator, CI.95 = (-.83, -.04). Participants in the ingroup change condition felt more 
collective guilt for Americans’ greenhouse gas emissions than those in the stability 
condition, β = .25, p < .01. For each unit change in collective guilt, participants were 
11.2% more likely to sign-up for additional information about global warming, Wald 
χ2(1) = 5.56, p < .05. However, collective anxiety was not a significant mediator, CI.95 
= (-.50, .07).  
Environmental Attitudes 
Analysis of variance. The effects of ingroup stability and change on pro-
environmental attitudes were examined using a one-way ANOVA. Participants in the 
ingroup change condition expressed stronger pro-environmental attitudes (M = 3.00, 
SD = 0.94) than those in the stability condition (M = 2.57, SD = 0.92), F(1, 127) = 
6.23, p < .05. 
Mediation analysis. The effects of perceived ingroup stability and change on 
pro-environmental attitudes were examined first. Participants in the ingroup change 
condition expressed stronger pro-environmental attitudes than those in the stability 
condition, β = .45, p < .05. However, when collective guilt and anxiety were included 
as mediators in the equation, ingroup stability and change was no longer related to 
pro-environmental attitudes, β = .11, p = .40.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of ingroup stability 
and change on pro-environmental attitudes was then examined. Collective guilt was a 
significant mediator, CI.95 = (.04, .32). Participants in the ingroup change condition 
experienced more collective guilt for Americans’ greenhouse gas emissions than 
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those in the stability condition, β = .53, p < .01. Participants who experienced more 
collective guilt expressed stronger pro-environmental attitudes, β = .27, p < .01. 
Collective anxiety was also a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.03, .43). Participants in 
the ingroup change condition experienced more collective anxiety about future 
ingroup harm than those in the stability condition, β = .41, p < .05. Participants who 
experienced more collective anxiety expressed stronger pro-environmental attitudes, 
β = .50, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 2 provided additional support for the notion that people 
can experience collective guilt for present-day behaviors that harm future ingroup 
members. Heightened perceptions of ingroup stability diminished environmental 
attitudes, willingness to engage in behaviors aimed at lessening global warming, and 
providing one’s email address to receive more information about global warming. 
When the world for future ingroup members will be largely the same as it is in the 
present, then there is less need or impetus to foster changes that help reduce global 
warming. In contrast, when the future ingroup’s world will be different than it is in 
the present, then there is greater need to make changes to reduce global warming. 
The relationship between ingroup stability and change on green attitudes and 
practices was mediated by collective guilt, even when collective anxiety was 
accounted for. That is, perceiving the present and future as similar reduces collective 
guilt for contributing to greenhouse gas emissions, even after exposure to scientific 
evidence connecting such emissions to global warming. These results are consistent 
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with previous research on collective guilt, which shows that collective guilt motivates 
attitudes and behavior related to promoting better future outcomes for the ingroup 
(e.g., repairing the harm done, reconciliation; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). 
They also provide further support for the value of collective guilt in motivating 
reductions in global warming.  
 Nonetheless, it is not clear why collective guilt promoted only the request for 
more information about global warming, but not the taking of a sticker. One possible 
explanation is that participants did not believe that displaying a green sticker would 
be effective in helping to reduce global warming. Displaying a sticker might not make 
any difference, as others might simply ignore the sticker and continue to contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, more information might allow participants to 
learn about what changes they could make, or encourage others to make, in order to 
effectively reduce global warming. A second possibility is that publicly accepting and 
displaying a sticker in support of global warming reduction might not be perceived as 
socially desirable to other ingroup members, perhaps suggesting that participants held 
extreme views on the environment. This aversive self-categorization might lead them 
to opt for more private or easily justifiable behaviors, such as requesting information 
about global warming (e.g., Goffman, 1959).  
 Furthermore, it is interesting that collective anxiety served a broader 
mediating role in Study 2 than in Study 1. This could be due to the decreased 
psychological distance in time across the studies (20 years in Study 2 vs. 50 years in 
Study 1), but it could also be due to the different independent variable used in the 
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mediation analyses (ingroup stability vs. harm likelihood) as well as others factors 
(e.g., the newer measure of guilt, rising energy prices between the two studies). Even 
if harm is likely to happen, this might not matter as much if the future impact of the 
harm is diminished by the perception of future ingroup stability. Although it is not 
possible to adjudicate between the different explanations for the stronger presence of 
collective anxiety in Study 2 (nor did this work attempt to do so), the issue of harm 
severity was examined in more depth in Study 3.  
 The results of Study 2 also provide some support for the notion that the effects 
of perceived ingroup stability and change on collective guilt are channeled through 
the legitimizations closely tied to reaffirming the legitimacy of present-day ingroup 
behavior (collective responsibility and collective legitimacy), rather than through 
those closely tied to realistic appraisals of the harm and the group’s potential to cope 
with it (harm likelihood and collective efficacy). That is, perceived ingroup stability 
reduces collective guilt by increasing the legitimacy of present-day ingroup 
greenhouse gas emissions, and denying responsibility for the effects of global 
warming—rather than via the perceived harm likelihood or collective efficacy. If the 
future is going to be the same as today, then it is okay to produce greenhouse gases 
and our group is not responsible for global warming. This seems consistent with the 
view that the global warming debate is mainly a controversy of legitimacy over 
present-day group action, rather than an attempt to assess the veracity and effects of 
global warming. However, the stronger mediating role of collective anxiety in Study 
2 provides some evidence against this view, as collective anxiety is about preventing 
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future harm arising from global warming (Molden et al., 2008). Such prevention 
would apparently arise from realistic appraisals of the impending threat.  
 One potential issue that arises from Study 2 concerns the nature of the 
manipulation. It could be that the manipulation is confounded by the content that 
participants wrote for the manipulation of stability and change. For instance, it could 
be that in the change condition, participants overwhelmingly wrote about increased 
environmental awareness in the future, resulting in stronger green attitudes and 
practices in that condition. Indeed, there is evidence that participants wrote more 
about greater environmental awareness in the change condition than they did in the 
stability condition. This issue was mentioned at least 15 times by participants in the 
change condition, more than any other difference between present and future ingroup 
members. Nevertheless, this difference in participants’ text responses cannot explain 
why there was no difference between the initial control and change conditions. If the 
greater attention drawn to increased environmental awareness produced the findings 
on green attitudes and practices, then one would have expected to see differences 
between the control and change conditions. There were none. It seems that the key 
difference is between the ingroup stability condition and the other two conditions.  
 Study 2 has one important limitation that should be considered. This concerns 
measurement order. Most of the legitimizations were measured after collective guilt, 
rather than before it, because of concerns about potential reactivity and suspicion. 
However, this raises potential interpretive issues, particularly for the mediation of 
ingroup stability and change on collective guilt via legitimizations. If one wants to 
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substantiate the causal relationships between ingroup stability, legitimizations, and 
collective guilt, then it seems appropriate to measure the variables in the order of the 
predicted sequence of effects. In Study 3, the dependent measures were reordered to 
remedy this limitation, with one exception. Collective efficacy was still measured 
after collective guilt based on concerns about reactivity (Schmitt et al., 2008).  
Study 3 
 Study 3 employed an experimental design to examine the effects of perceived 
global warming impact and cause on legitimizations, collective emotions, and green 
attitudes and practices. Recall that Study 2 manipulated perceived ingroup stability 
and change—the degree to which the future ingroup would be perceived as the same 
as the present-day ingroup. This perception of stability was general; it was grounded 
in participants’ perceptions of similarity between the cultural activities or beliefs of 
present and future ingroup members. The perception of stability was not specific to 
the consequences of global warming on future ingroup members; it was not focused 
on the harmful changes produced by global warming.  
Study 3 directly manipulates the degree of ingroup stability by varying the 
perceived impact that global warming will have on future ingroup members—a minor 
impact (relative ingroup stability) or a major impact (relative ingroup change). When 
people downplay the harm from global warming, they are likewise suggesting that the 
future ingroup will be relatively stable in response to global warming, which reduces 
adherence to green attitudes and practices. In contrast, when people cannot deny the 
negative consequences of global warming, they are conceding that the ingroup will 
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experience change, presumably relative to the degree of impact. Therefore, the 
manipulation of global warming impact seemingly focuses on more than harm 
severity—it focuses on ingroup stability and change directly resulting from the 
consequences of global warming on future ingroup members.  
Study 3 also employed a manipulation of global warming cause. Recall that 
legitimizations that reaffirm the acceptability of ingroup greenhouse gas emissions 
mediated the effects of perceived harm likelihood on collective guilt in Study 2—
collective responsibility and collective legitimacy. If collective responsibility is a 
legitimization, then reducing responsibility for global warming should reduce the 
ingroup’s sense of illegitimacy—thus, undermining members’ impetus to adopt 
attitudes and practices that mitigate global warming (Wohl et al., 2006).  
This apparently underlies the controversy surrounding what causes global 
warming—whether it is caused by human action (e.g., human-produced greenhouse 
gas emissions) or natural processes (e.g., increased solar activity or recovery from a 
previous ice age). When nature is perceived to cause global warming, this legitimizes 
the ingroup’s greenhouse gas emissions, undermining the motivation to adopt green 
attitudes and practices. Conversely, when humans are perceived to cause global 
warming, this delegitimizes the ingroup’s greenhouse gas emissions, promoting the 
motivation to adopt green attitudes and practices. Accordingly, Study 3 manipulates 
the cause of global warming, whether it is caused by natural versus human processes.  
These two legitimizations—perceived global warming impact and cause— 
should interact in interesting ways. First, when global warming is perceived to have 
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only a minor impact on the future ingroup and natural processes cause global 
warming, then this provides a particularly high degree of legitimization for present 
greenhouse gas emissions. When global warming is a natural process that will not 
harm the future ingroup, then there is little impetus to espouse green attitudes and 
behaviors. Second, when global warming is perceived to have a major impact on the 
future ingroup and human processes cause global warming, then this provides a 
particularly low degree of legitimization for present greenhouse gas emissions. When 
global warming is a human-caused process that will harm the future ingroup, then 
there is greater impetus to espouse green attitudes and behaviors, so as to reduce 
global warming.  
Three predictions are made for Study 3. First, a global warming cause by 
global warming impact interaction is expected on legitimizations, collective 
emotions, and green attitudes and behaviors. Legitimizations will be strongest in the 
natural cause/minor impact condition, and weakest in the human cause/major impact 
condition. In the former case, stronger legitimization (lower harm severity, collective 
responsibility, and collective efficacy, as well as higher collective legitimacy), 
weaker collective guilt, and weaker green attitudes (higher political conservativism) 
and behaviors (willingness to pay environmental taxes) will be elicited, relative to all 
other conditions. In the latter case, weaker legitimization, stronger collective guilt, 
and stronger attitudes and behaviors supportive of reducing global warming will be 
elicited.   
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Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 Seventy-seven participants (32 men and 45 women) participated in the study 
on a volunteer basis. All participants indicated that they were American citizens and 
had not previously completed a questionnaire on global warming. Participants were 
approached by a research assistant at university eateries and asked if they would 
consider participating in a public opinion poll on global warming, ostensibly 
conducted by the university climate research center.  
Upon agreeing to participate, the assistant handed the participant a two-page, 
single-sheet survey from a pile that had been randomized earlier and told them to 
begin by reading the information at the top of the first page. This information said 
that scientists have substantial evidence that global warming is real, but much less 
evidence about the causes of global warming or its effects on future Americans. The 
university climate research center had purportedly conducted a landmark study to 
examine these issues, and was now conducting a poll to get public reactions to their 
findings.   
The information that followed manipulated the cause of global warming 
(human vs. nature) and the severity of harm to the future ingroup (minor vs. major 
impact)—Americans in the next fifty years (comparable to Study 1). For instance, 
participants in the minor impact/natural cause condition read that “…the study 
provided strong evidence that global warming is primarily caused by natural 
processes, such as increases in solar and volcanic activity; further, the study provided 
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strong evidence that global warming will have only a minor impact on the United 
States in the future, confined mostly to occasional hot days or some localized 
flooding” (see Appendix B, p. 109 for complete manipulation text). After reading this 
information, participants completed the dependent measures. The manipulation and 
dependent measures maintained participants’ social identity salience by repeatedly 
mentioning “American” throughout the text. After completing the survey, participants 
were given a debriefing sheet and thanked for their participation (see Appendix F, p. 
117 for the debriefing information) 
Dependent Measures 
The dependent measures for Study 3 generally represent a sampling of those 
used in Study 2. First, participants completed measures of legitimizations—harm 
severity, collective responsibility, and collective legitimacy. They first completed a 
measure of harm severity. This measure consisted of three questions (α = .92), such as 
“How much harm do you think global warming will cause to Americans in the 
future?” Participants responded on scales ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a whole 
lot). They next completed a measure of collective responsibility. This measure 
consisted of three questions (α = .90), such as “To what extent do you believe that 
Americans today are largely responsible for the effects of global warming?” They 
then completed a measure of legitimacy. This measure consisted of three questions (α 
= .77), such as “To what extent do you believe it is wrong that Americans today 
contribute to greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming energy, 
and in other ways)?” One legitimacy question (the “not okay” item) was omitted from 
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subsequent analyses because it significantly reduced the reliability of the composite 
measure. Participants responded to these two measures on scales ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (extremely).  
 Second, participants completed measures of collective emotions. They 
completed a measure of collective anxiety. This measure consisted of three questions 
(α = .90), such as “To what extent do you feel nervous about the impact of global 
warming on Americans in the future?” They next completed a measure of collective 
guilt. This measure consisted of three questions (α = .89), such as “To what extent do 
you feel guilty that Americans today contribute to greenhouse gas emissions (by 
driving automobiles, consuming electricity, and in other ways)?” Participants then 
completed a measure of collective efficacy. This measure consisted of three questions 
(α = .98), such as “To what extent do you believe that if Americans today worked 
together, then they could reduce the impact of global warming on Americans in the 
future?” Participants responded to these three measures on scales ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (extremely).  
 Third, participants completed measures of green attitudes and practices. They 
completed a measure of willingness to pay environmental taxes. This measure 
consisted of three questions (α = .85), such as “To what extent would you willing to 
support a 20¢ per gallon gasoline tax, designed to encourage people to use less 
gasoline or obtain a more fuel efficient vehicle?” Participants responded on scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). They then indicated their political 
attitudes. This measure consisted of one question, which read “What best captures 
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your political views?” Participants responded by circling Republican, Democrat, or 
neither. 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 Study 3 examines whether collective emotions mediate the effects of global 
warming cause type on pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors. The potential 
mediating role of legitimizations on collective guilt was also examined. To examine 
these issues, analysis of variance was conducted on all measures, including the 
measure of political attitudes. Despite its constrained variability, the underlying 
distribution of the political attitudes measure is continuous. This measure was thus 
coded to reflect the underlying distribution (1 = Democrat, 2 = Neither, 3 = 
Republican).  It is important to point out that analysis of variance is reasonably robust 
to deviations of normality in dependent measures, even in severe cases (e.g., Myers & 
Wells, 2003). Afterwards, mediation analyses were conducted using the procedures 
outlined in Study 1. For these analyses, the manipulation of global warming cause 
type was coded natural = 0 and human = 1. 
 As will be seen in subsequent analyses, the human cause/major impact 
component of the predictions did not reach significance for any of the dependent 
measures. More commentary on why this occurred will be provided in the discussion. 
Nonetheless, the natural cause/minor impact component of the predictions did reach 
significance for most dependent measures. The manipulation of global warming cause 
type seemed to account for the results of the dependent measures with the minor 
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impact condition (not vice versa); this is consistent with the suggestions that the 
global warming controversy is more about legitimization than it is about realistic 
appraisal. Accordingly, planned comparisons were conducted on significant ANOVA 
interaction effects to examine the difference between the natural cause/minor impact 
condition and the other three conditions. Mediation analyses were also conducted 
using global warming cause as a predictor to examine its effects on dependent 
measures in the minor impact condition. This approach seemed to be the most 
sensible way of testing the predicted results given the obtained findings.  
In order to simplify the presentation of results for Study 3, two tables have 
been presented. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for green attitude and 
practice measures, while Table 6 presents standardized beta coefficients for the 
mediation analyses. In addition, the correlations among legitimizations, collective 
emotions, and green attitudes and practices can be found in Appendices J-M (pp. 124-
127).  
Legitimizations for Present Ingroup Behavior 
Analysis of variance. The effects of global warming cause and harm severity 
on legitimizations for present ingroup behavior were examined using a 2 (cause: 
nature, human) x 2 (severity: minor, major) ANOVA. The legitimizations that attempt 
to reaffirm the acceptability of ingroup behavior were examined first. For collective 
responsibility, the main effect of global warming cause was significant, F(1, 73) = 
9.79, p < .01. Participants in the human cause condition perceived more collective  
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green Attitudes 
and Practices by Global Warming Cause and Harm Severity 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
              Minor                       Major 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Nature           Human           Nature          Human 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Harm  M 2.51  3.87  3.54  3.91 
     Severity  SD 1.34  0.83  0.94  0.97 
   
     Collective  M 2.94  3.78  3.38  3.95 
     Responsibility SD 1.40  0.67  0.98  0.76 
 
     Collective  M 3.38  2.50  3.24  2.55 
     Legitimacy  SD 1.05  0.94  1.33  0.98 
 
     Collective  M 3.49  4.06  3.86  3.98 
     Efficacy  SD 1.59  1.18  1.21  1.15 
 
     Collective  M 2.35  3.65  2.87  3.09 
     Guilt  SD 1.08  0.84  1.12  1.01 
 
     Collective  M 2.43  3.65  3.32  3.51 
     Anxiety  SD 1.33  0.78  1.20  1.10 
 
     Environmental M 2.00  2.93  2.17  2.65                 
     Taxes  SD 1.18  1.10  1.26  1.15 
 
     Political  M 2.12  1.44  1.61  1.64  
     Conservativism SD 0.78  0.62  0.72  0.75 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
responsibility for global warming (M = 3.87, SD = 1.18) than those in the natural 
cause condition (M = 3.19, SD = 0.71). This supports the validity of the global 
warming cause manipulation, as natural causes would presumably entail lower human 
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responsibility. For legitimacy, the main effect of global warming cause was 
significant, F(1, 73) = 9.58, p < .01. Participants in the human cause condition 
perceived that ingroup greenhouse gas emissions were less legitimate (M = 2.53, SD 
= 0.95) than those in the natural cause condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.21). 
Second, the legitimizations that involve portraying global warming in a 
positive manner were examined. For harm severity, the main effect of impact 
condition was significant, F(1, 73) = 5.17, p < .05. Participants in the major impact 
condition perceived more harm severity (M = 3.71, SD = 0.96) than those in the 
minor impact condition (M = 3.21, SD = 1.29), (M = 2.93, SD = 1.00). This supports 
the validity of the manipulation of harm severity. The main effect of global warming 
cause was also significant, F(1, 73) = 13.65, p < .001. Participants in the human cause 
condition reported that global warming would be more harmful (M = 3.89, SD = 0.89) 
than those in the natural cause condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.22). These main effects 
were qualified by a global warming cause by impact condition interaction, F(1, 73) = 
4.39, p < .05. Participants in the minor impact/natural cause condition reported that 
global warming would be less harmful (M = 2.51, SD = 1.34) than those in the other 
conditions (M = 3.76, SD = 0.92), t(73) = -4.48, p < .001. For collective efficacy, no 
effects were obtained.  
Motivations for Reducing Global Warming 
Analysis of variance. The effects of global warming cause and harm severity 
on collective emotions were examined using a 2 (cause: nature, human) x 2 (severity: 
minor, major) ANOVA. For collective guilt, the main effect of global warming cause 
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was significant, F(1, 73) = 10.38, p < .01. Participants in the human cause condition 
(M = 3.36, SD = 0.96) reported more collective guilt for Americans’ greenhouse gas 
emissions than those in the natural cause condition (M = 2.65, SD = 1.12). This main 
effect was qualified by a global warming cause by harm severity interaction, F(1, 73) 
=  5.26, p < .05. Participants in the minor impact/natural cause condition reported less 
collective guilt (M = 2.35, SD = 1.08) than those in the other conditions (M = 2.51, 
SD = 1.34), t(73) = -3.01, p < .01.  
For collective anxiety, the main effect of global warming cause was 
significant, F(1, 73) = 7.46, p < .01. Participants in the human cause condition (M = 
3.58, SD = 0.95) reported more collective anxiety for the harm done to future ingroup 
members than those in the natural cause condition (M = 2.94, SD = 1.32). This main 
effect was qualified by a global warming cause by harm severity interaction, F(1, 73) 
= 3.97, p < .05. Participants in the minor impact/natural cause condition reported less 
collective anxiety about harm to the future ingroup (M = 2.00, SD = 1.18) than those 
in the other conditions (M = 2.55, SD = 1.20), t(73) = -3.43, p < .01.  
Mediation analysis. The effects of global warming cause on collective guilt 
were examined first. Participants in the human cause condition experienced more 
collective guilt for Americans’ greenhouse gas emissions than those in the natural 
cause condition, β = .60, p < .001. However, when the legitimizations were included 
as mediators in the equation, global warming cause was no longer related to collective 
guilt, β = .23, p = .07.  
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Whether legitimizations for present ingroup behavior mediated the effects of 
global warming cause on collective guilt within the minor impact condition was then 
examined. First, the mediating role of legitimizations that reaffirm the acceptability of 
present ingroup behavior was examined. Collective responsibility was not a 
significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.05, .17). However, legitimacy was a significant 
mediator, CI.95 = (.05, .36). Participants in the human cause condition perceived 
ingroup greenhouse gas emissions as less legitimate than those in the natural cause 
condition, β = -.39, p < .05. Participants who perceived ingroup greenhouse gas 
emissions as less legitimate experienced more collective guilt, β = .39, p < .01. 
Second, the mediating role of legitimizations that reappraise global warming 
in a positive manner was examined. Harm severity was not a significant mediator, 
CI.95 = (-.04, .40), nor was collective efficacy, CI.95 = (-.03, .23). 
Environmental Taxes 
Analysis of variance. The effects of global warming cause and harm severity 
on willingness to pay environmental taxes were examined using a 2 (cause: nature, 
human) x 2 (severity: minor, major) ANOVA. The main effect of global warming 
cause was significant, F(1, 73) = 6.69, p < .05. Participants in the human cause 
condition expressed greater willingness to pay environmental taxes (M = 2.78, SD = 
1.12) than those in the natural cause condition (M = 2.10, SD = 1.22).  
Mediation analysis. The effects of global warming cause on willingness to pay 
environmental taxes were examined first. Participants in the human cause condition 
expressed more willingness to pay environmental taxes than those in the natural cause 
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Table 6 
Standardized Beta Coefficients for Mediations of Collective Emotions on Green 
Attitudes and Practices 
 
XÆM  MÆY  XÆY1  XÆY2  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Environmental Taxes 
     Collective Guilt  .60***  .52*  .39*  .05 
     Collective Anxiety  .52**             .05   ---   --- 
 
Political Conservativism 
     Collective Guilt   ---  .43  .46**             .14 
     Collective Anxiety   ---  .12   ---              --- 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. XÆM = harm likelihood on mediator; MÆY = mediator on green practice; 
XÆY1 = harm likelihood on green practice excluding mediators; XÆY2 = harm 
likelihood on green practice including mediators.   
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
condition, β = .39, p < .05. However, when collective guilt and anxiety were included 
as mediators in the equation, global warming cause was no longer related to 
willingness to pay environmental taxes, β = .05, p = .80.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of global warming 
cause on willingness to pay environmental taxes within the minor impact condition 
was examined next. Collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.09, .64). 
Participants in the human cause condition experienced more collective guilt for 
Americans’ greenhouse gas emissions than those in the natural cause condition, β = 
.60, p < .001. Participants who experienced more collective guilt expressed greater 
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willingness to pay environmental taxes, β = .52, p < .05. However, collective anxiety 
was not a significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.27, .34).  
Political Attitudes 
Analysis of variance. The effects of global warming cause and harm severity 
on political attitudes were examined using a 2 (cause: nature, human) x 2 (severity: 
minor, major) ANOVA. A global warming cause by harm severity interaction was 
obtained, F(1, 73) = 5.14, p < .05. Participants in the minor impact/natural cause 
condition reported stronger conservative attitudes (M = 2.42, SD = 0.70) than those in 
the other conditions (M = 1.88, SD = 0.78), t(73) = -2.72, p < .01.  
Mediation analysis. The effects of global warming cause on political attitudes 
were examined first. Participants in the natural cause condition expressed stronger 
conservative attitudes than those in the human cause condition, β = .46, p < .01. 
However, when collective guilt and anxiety were included as mediators in the 
equation, global warming cause was no longer related to political attitudes, β = .14, p 
= .44.  
Whether collective guilt and anxiety mediated the effects of global warming 
cause on political attitudes within the minor impact condition was examined next. 
Collective guilt was a significant mediator, CI.95 = (.03, .64). Participants in the 
human cause condition experienced more collective guilt for Americans’ greenhouse 
gas emissions than those in the natural cause condition, β = .60, p < .001. Participants 
who experienced more collective guilt did not express stronger liberal attitudes, β = 
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.43, p = .06. However, collective anxiety was not a significant mediator, CI.95 = (-.09, 
.44).  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 3 provide further evidence in support of the notion that 
people can experience collective guilt for present-day behavior that harms future 
ingroup members. The minor impact/natural cause condition generally produced a 
stronger degree of legitimization for present-day ingroup behavior, which led to the 
lowest levels of collective guilt, willingness to pay environmental taxes, and political 
liberalism relative to the other conditions.  
 Relative to the minor impact/natural cause condition, the major impact/human 
cause condition did not produce a weaker degree of legitimization for present-day 
ingroup behavior. Nor did this condition elicit higher levels of collective guilt, 
willingness to pay environmental taxes, and political liberalism. One possibility is 
that it is easier to reduce collective guilt than it is to increase collective guilt—thus, 
the predicted effects were found in the minor impact/natural cause condition, but not 
the major impact/human cause condition. Another possibility is that responsibility for 
the harm done to future ingroup members will matter most in conditions of minimal 
harm. It is plausible that in conditions of maximal harm, eliminating negative impacts 
becomes the overriding concern. This is consistent with research on risk perception 
demonstrating that high impact threats are related to lower perceived controllability, 
rendering responsibility less relevant to resulting feelings, thoughts, and behaviors 
(Breakwell, 2008; Reicher, Podpadex, Macnaghton, Brown, & Eiser, 1993). A final 
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possibility is that the human cause/major impact survey was less believable than the 
surveys in the other conditions, thus not eliciting increased collective guilt.  
 The latter possibility can be taken a step further to understand the mediation 
analyses in earlier studies. Given that the mediation analyses in Study 3 worked only 
within the minor impact condition, and the mediation analyses worked in previous 
studies without directly manipulating impact, then it stands to reason that the results 
obtained from Studies 1 and 2 reflected people’s general expectation that global 
warming will produce only a minor impact in the future. When major impact was 
manipulated, the predicted effects on collective emotions, as well as green attitudes 
and practices, are no longer reliable. Of course, one should view this interpretation 
carefully, as the key predictor variables across the three studies differ in meaningful 
ways. Nonetheless, all three studies share a key commonality—their predictors 
generally focus on future ingroup stability and change, despite using different 
operationalizations.  
 The results of Study 3 also showed that collective anxiety represented a much 
weaker mediator than in Study 2. It is difficult to know why collective anxiety did not 
have a broader mediating role. There are at least two possibilities. One is that 
collective anxiety is not as relevant in the minor impact condition. That is, when the 
harm is not as imposing, then people do not feel compelled to prevent the harm that 
might occur. Another possibility is that psychological distance in time (50 years in 
Study 1 and 3 versus 20 years in Study 2) lowered the relevance of collective anxiety 
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for adopting pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors. In this case, only collective 
guilt would be useful in promoting the reduction of global warming.  
 Additionally, only legitimacy mediated the effects of global warming cause on 
collective guilt within the minor impact condition. This provides some support for the 
notion that the global warming controversy is primarily about legitimization of the 
present ingroup’s behavior than it is about appraisals of the realistic threat posed by 
global warming. Nevertheless, it remains possible that the immediacy of the threat 
affects the tendency to generate realistic appraisals of the threat versus legitimize 
present ingroup behavior.  
The results of Study 3 must be interpreted in the context of its key limitations. 
One limitation is measurement order. Although Study 3 is improved in this manner 
over Study 2, collective efficacy was still measured after collective guilt because of 
concerns about suspicion—that directly asking about whether Americans could do 
something about global warming would suggest that our study focused on this topic, 
thereby eliciting questionable effects on subsequent measures. Another limitation is 
that the dependent measures are comprised of a relatively small number of items, as 
low as one item in the case of political attitudes. Single item scales can be unreliable, 
unless they are straightforward (e.g., Robins, Hendlin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Other 
scales had three items, so as to pragmatically fit the manipulations and measures on a 
single sheet of paper. Nonetheless, such limitations should presumably work against 
the predicted effects, which were still obtained on most dependent measures.  
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General Discussion 
 The results of these three studies support the notion that people can experience 
collective guilt for present-day behavior that will harm future ingroup members. The 
results of Study 1 show that collective guilt mediates the relationship between the 
likelihood of harm to future ingroup members and willingness to engage in five types 
of behaviors aimed at reducing global warming. Collective guilt also mediates the 
relationship between harm likelihood on pro-environmental attitudes. Collective 
anxiety only mediates the relationship between harm likelihood and willingness to 
engage in one behavior, environmental advocacy.  
 The results of Study 2 show that increases in perceived ingroup stability can 
diminish the need and impetus for reducing global warming. First, it can increase 
legitimization by reducing the perceived likelihood of harm from global warming and 
collective responsibility for global warming, as well as increasing legitimacy. Second, 
this increase in legitimization is reflected in a decrease in collective emotions, both 
collective guilt and collective anxiety. This increased legitimization is also reflected 
in a decrease in willingness to engage in four-of-the-five types of behaviors aimed at 
reducing global warming (excluding paying environmental taxes), as well as a lower 
frequency of providing one’s email address in order to receive further information 
about global warming. Increased legitimization is also reflected in weaker pro-
environmental attitudes.  
 The results of Study 2 also show that collective guilt and collective anxiety 
mediated the effects on green attitudes and practices. Increased ingroup stability led 
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to diminished willingness to engage in green attitudes and practices via diminished 
collective emotions. Moreover, legitimizations related to affirming the acceptability 
of present-day ingroup behavior mediated the relationship between perceived harm 
likelihood and collective guilt. Legitimizations related to assessing the realistic threat 
posed by global warming failed to mediate this relationship.  
 The results of Study 3 show that the legitimization provided by perceiving the 
impact of global warming as minor and stemming from natural causes diminished the 
motivation to reduce global warming. This enhanced degree of legitimization led to 
reduced collective guilt and collective anxiety, as well as reduced willingness to pay 
environmental taxes, relative to all other conditions. It also led to increased political 
conservativism. Furthermore, when the impact of global warming is perceived as 
minor, collective guilt mediated the relationship between global warming cause and 
green attitudes and practices.  
 Taken together, the results of these three studies lend support to two general 
conclusions. First, people can experience collective guilt for present-day behavior that 
harms future ingroup members. Such guilt was found in response to the perceived 
likelihood that harm would occur, as well as to the perceived severity of harm that 
would occur. This suggests that perceived harm can play a role in the legitimization 
of present-day ingroup behaviors that contribute to global warming. As in previous 
research on collective guilt, downplaying the harm from global warming can lower 
guilt and willingness to engage in behaviors to remedy ingroup harm-doing. 
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 Second, legitimizations closely tied to reaffirming the acceptability of present-
day ingroup behavior channel the effects of perceived harm on collective guilt. This 
suggests that the controversy over global warming is primarily about the legitimacy 
of present-day ingroup behavior, rather than determining whether global warming is a 
genuine threat to future ingroup members. It further calls into question whether there 
is a firm distinction between realistic and symbolic threats to social identity (Stephan 
& Stephan, 2000). Perception is responsive to reality, but socially-mediated (Turner, 
1991). Accordingly, what seems like realistic perception might derive more from the 
prevailing consensus than from the bona fide features of reality.  
 Third, collective guilt represents a valuable motivation in efforts to reduce 
global warming. In all three of the studies, collective guilt mediated the relationship 
between perceived harm and green attitudes and practices. These effects held even 
once collective anxiety, another plausible motivation for reducing global warming, 
had been accounted for.  In general, the results do not support a negative state affect 
interpretation. If the collective emotion measures captured only a negative affective 
state, then collective anxiety and collective guilt should have yielded similar results 
across studies. They did not. Differential emotion, rather than undifferentiated affect, 
better accounts for the findings across studies. Thus, the present research suggests 
that collective emotions, such as collective guilt, play a unique role in supporting 
green attitudes and practices—above and beyond negative affective states.  
 The results of these studies do suggest a more nuanced picture of the role that 
collective emotions play in motivating pro-environmental behavior. For instance, in 
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Study 2, collective guilt motivated the request for further information about global 
warming, but collective anxiety did not. And neither collective emotion motivated 
willingness to pay environmental taxes or accepting a sticker that promotes global 
warming reduction. One possible explanation for these findings is that participants 
thought that paying taxes and displaying a sticker would be ineffective at reducing 
global warming. If so, then collective emotions should have less to do with these 
behaviors than with other, more effective behaviors.  
 Even so, this does not explain why the request for more information about 
global warming was associated with collective guilt, but not collective anxiety. It 
seems plausible that the act of requesting more information about global warming 
psychologically replaces substantive behavior to reduce global warming—thereby 
discharging any collective guilt participants might have experienced. This appears 
consistent with research showing that being better informed about global warming 
can paradoxically reduce feelings of responsibility (Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 
2008). Generally speaking, the act of learning can diminish the impetus for doing, 
perhaps because it leads people to feel that they have already acted to reduce the 
negative effects of global warming, when they have not (Moser & Dilling, 2007). 
 The mediating role of collective guilt in Study 3 was limited to perceptions of 
minor impact, rather than also extending to major impact. One way to explain this 
finding is by suggesting that collective guilt is easier to decrease than it is to increase. 
Providing people with legitimizations (e.g., global warming will only lead to minor 
harm in the future, it is caused by natural processes) might lower collective guilt, but 
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actually increasing guilt requires undermining the numerous ways that people have 
for justifying their present-day ingroup behavior (Wohl et al., 2006).  
Another way to explain this finding is that responsibility might play a lesser 
role when ingroups are faced with certain major harm. For instance, risk perception 
research has shown that events perceived as catastrophically harmful are also less 
likely to be seen as controllable (Breakwell, 2008; Slovic, 2000). Some researchers 
have suggested that controllability is important for the experience of guilt (Roseman, 
2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007b; Weiner, 2006). Although human-caused events might 
be perceived as having catastrophic consequences (Reicher et al., 1993), they might 
concomitantly reduce the weight of responsibility for tackling those consequences. 
This is consistent with the notion that realistic appraisals of harm events might be 
more important when ingroup members have prior expectations that harm might 
actually occur (Turner, 1991).  
Implications of Results for Existing Research 
Social Identity 
 The phenomenon of collective emotions is premised on the salience of social 
identity and its consequences for appraising emotion-relevant events. This research 
has suggested that collective emotions can motivate change in present-day behavior 
that contributes to global warming. This is consistent with research on environmental 
identity, which shows that when individuals self-categorize as part of nature (rather 
than as separate from it), they express more willingness to engage in green practices 
(Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Self-categorization as a part of a group that supports 
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global warming reduction could be useful in advancing positive environmental 
outcomes.  
 In addition, this research has suggested that perceptions of future events can 
serve to legitimize present-day ingroup actions, as well as alternative actions in the 
future. This is consistent with research on social identity and collective action (see 
Sturmer & Simon, 2004 for a review). For instance, Sturmer, Simon, Loewy, and 
Jorger (2003) found that the relationship between identification with an organized 
social movement and willingness to participate in movement activities was fully 
mediated by a sense of inner obligation. This inner obligation derives from ingroup 
norms, which legitimize or delegitimize particular ingroup behaviors. Feeling such an 
obligation suggests that participation in the group’s activities is considered legitimate, 
whereas other activities are considered illegitimate. However, perceptions of future 
events, such as considering that movement activities would be ineffective, could 
delegitimize engagement in them—thus, eliminating the inner obligation.  
 Although a question remains about whether the inner obligation in Sturmer et 
al. (2003) reflected legitimate group activities or other illegitimate activities, it seems 
plausible that collective emotions played an important role. For instance, it could be 
that participants felt collective pride in response to their anticipated engagement in 
the group’s legitimate activities (e.g., “I’ll feel proud to be at the protest”). However, 
it could also be that participants felt collective guilt for recalling their part in another 
group’s activities in the past, which go against the present group’s efforts (e.g., “We 
shouldn’t have done that back then, but going to this protest can assuage this guilt”). 
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In either case, it seems that collective emotions grounded in perceived future events 
plays a key role in the willingness to engage in collective action. This is consistent 
with the present results, which show that collective emotion mediates the effects of 
legitimization on willingness to engage in environmental advocacy.  
Collective Emotions 
 The present research has implications for research on collective emotions. It 
has been suggested that such research generally examines a limited range of emotion-
related events—events that are temporally removed from and relatively uncommon 
among present-day ingroup members. This emphasis stems from attempts to 
demonstrate discrepancies between personal and collective emotions via the 
implausibility of experiencing relevant personal emotions. This is unnecessary, even 
inconsistent with self-categorization theory and its focus on transformations in the 
meaning of behavior. Accordingly, by emphasizing the transformation of meaning 
over the impossibility of experiencing personal emotions, research on collective 
emotions can examine a broader range of emotionally-relevant events.  
 The present research also has implications for research on collective guilt. 
One implication is that people can feel collective guilt for harms that will occur in the 
future, as well as harms that occurred in the past. Similar to research focusing on past 
harms, research focusing on future harms suggests that social identity makes harm to 
future group members relevant to the present ingroup (Wohl et al., 2006). Likewise, 
as with research on past harms, research on future harms suggests that legitimization 
plays an important role in mitigating collective guilt. The importance of denial and 
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justification in the resolution of negative states has a long history in psychology 
(Allport, 1954; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Festinger, 1957; Freud, 1937; Tarvis & 
Aronson, 2007; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). This is no less true with collective guilt. 
It is plausible that denying the existence of global warming in the face of definitive 
evidence to the contrary has similar psychological underpinnings to denying an 
ingroup’s role in historical tragedies—the Jewish Holocaust, the Native-American 
Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, and numerous others.  
 Another implication that the present research has for existing research on 
collective guilt is to question the assumption that harm-doing results from intentional 
behavior. In existing research, collective guilt stems from harm that ingroups inflict 
on outgroups (e.g., colonization, genocide), which seemingly stem from intentional 
behavior. In contrast, the present research focuses on a harm that ingroups inflict on 
themselves, which did not require intentionality. It is possible that even the most 
well-meaning ingroup members will misjudge how their actions will affect future 
events. The potential for unintentional consequences to generate collective guilt seem 
particularly poignant when harm occurs in the future—but, this does not exclude the 
possibility that ingroup-outgroup distinctions might not only reflect intentional harm-
related behavior.  
Reducing Global Warming 
The present research has implications for psychological research on reducing 
global warming. One implication is for research on the role of information in helping 
to promote pro-environmental behavior. Increased knowledge about global warming 
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has been found to predict pro-environmental behavior (Gifford, 2007). Nonetheless, 
many researchers have suggested that increased knowledge might actually diminish 
pro-environmental actions (e.g., Kellstedt et al., 2008; Moser & Dilling, 2007). For 
instance, many airlines offer passengers the opportunity to purchase carbon credits to 
help offset global warming. It is possible that carbon credits and other “low cost” 
behaviors do little to offset global warming, but rather help to discharge passengers’ 
collective guilt for greenhouse gas emissions stemming from air travel. Indeed, it is 
interesting that advocates of environmental education also advocate for cultivating 
feelings of responsibility (Gifford, 2007).  
Another implication of the present research is for models that examine the 
attitude-behavior consistency in social and environmental psychology (see Azjen & 
Fishbein, 2005; Gifford, 2007; Oskamp & Schultz, 2005 for noteworthy reviews). 
Researchers have long known that people with stronger pro-environmental attitudes 
do not necessarily perform more pro-environmental behaviors than do other people. 
Indeed, correlations between attitudes and behaviors vary across studies, with the 
lowest correlations coming from studies with measures of real behaviors (Gifford, 
2007). Models of attitude-behavior consistency provide explanations for the gaps 
between related attitudes and behaviors.  
Two attitude-behavior consistency models are particularly prominent in 
explaining pro-environmental behavior—the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; 
Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005) and the Value-Belief-Norm Model (VBN; Stern, 2000). 
TPB suggests that positive evaluations of, perceived social pressures to engage in, 
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and perceived ability to perform pro-environmental behaviors elicits intentions to 
engage in such behavior. Such intentions then elicit pro-environmental behaviors. 
VBN suggests that pro-environmental values lead to the belief that certain actions 
produce adverse environmental consequences, and that people will act to mitigate 
such consequences to the extent that they feel both responsible and able to do so. 
These two models are similar in that they emphasize how relevant attitudes and 
values can elicit pro-environmental behavior, when people perceive that they are 
sufficiently efficacious.  
The present research is both similar to and different from TPB and VBN. As 
for similarities, the present research is also concerned with how affect, social norms, 
and efficacy influence pro-environmental behavior. As for differences, three warrant 
mention. The first difference is that the present research distinguishes between 
undifferentiated attitudes and differentiated emotions. The present research shows 
that collective guilt mediated the relationship between perceived harm and pro-
environmental behavior, not collective anxiety—even though the valence of both 
emotions is negative. The difference between the emotions is not affective valence, 
but the meaning that such emotions have for ingroup members. Accordingly, TPB 
and VBN models might be improved by examining differential emotions, rather than 
undifferentiated affect.  
The second difference is that the present research examines a different causal 
sequence derived from research on collective guilt. It suggests that self-categorization 
as a group member provides the contextual frame for affective responses (Kahneman 
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& Tversky, 2000; Turner et al., 1994), that social norms stem from the salient group 
membership, and that inconsistency with social norms (i.e., illegitimacy) can provoke 
collective guilt. This sequence differs from TPB and VBN in that norms/values and 
affect are seen as the outcome of a dynamic process of self-categorization, rather than 
as preexisting causes for pro-environmental behavior. Therefore, shifting one’s self-
categorization in a particular situation should elicit different norms/values, as well as 
different behaviors. The apparent indifference of TPB and VBN to understanding the 
cause of attitudes is a limitation only insofar as their empirical instantiations do not 
elicit a variety of self-categorizations across participants. This would presumably 
undermine the predicted attitude-behavior relationship in any given application.  
The third difference is that the present research explains efficacy differently 
than TPB and VBN. In these models, efficacy seems to reflect the real world barriers 
that exist between wanting to and performing pro-environmental acts. However, the 
present research suggests that the perception of such barriers is socially-mediated 
(Turner, 1991). This means that what counts as evidence for efficacy will stem from 
ingroup norms, rather than solely from realistic assessments of the individual’s own 
capability in the situation. Furthermore, since the perception of efficacy is socially-
mediated, it is likely to lend justification to social practices that define the ingroup. 
There at least two ways that efficacy serves a legitimization function—by increasing 
justification for the existing social practices (such as suggesting that there are no real 
alternatives to fossil fuel engines) or by decreasing justification for alternative social 
practices (such as suggesting that steps to reduce global warming are futile because 
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China and India are not also trying to reduce it). However efficacy is conceptualized, 
it can provide justification for or against social practices that reduce global warming, 
irrespective of the reality of people’s capacity for making a difference.   
Limitations of the Present Research 
 The present research has two important limitations that should be addressed. 
The first limitation involves the passage about global warming presented in Study 2. 
This passage differed from similar passages in other studies in that future Americans 
were defined as twenty years in the future, rather than fifty years in the future. This 
could explain why the mediational role of collective anxiety on green attitudes and 
practices was stronger in Study 2 than it was in the other studies. Nevertheless, it is 
also possible that different predictor variables, dependent measures, and real world 
events (record spikes in energy prices) played a notable role. Thus, the findings for 
collective anxiety must be interpreted with caution. This seems less troublesome in 
the case of collective guilt, as its central findings replicate across the studies.  
 Nonetheless, it is important to not overstate the role of temporal distance in 
examining collective emotions for future harm. For instance, one might think that 
lowering temporal distance blurs the line between the present and future ingroup, 
thereby eliciting personal rather than collective emotions. As mentioned earlier, 
temporal distance does not adjudicate between personal and collective emotions; 
likewise, temporal distance does not adjudicate between present-day and future 
ingroups. It is no more appropriate to assume group continuity across time than to 
assume discontinuity. Social groups continually change as existing members leave or 
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simply grow older, and as new members join the ranks. What binds social groups 
together is a shared social identity and its implications for group members. 
The second limitation involves the generalizability of the results. Participants 
in this research are college students. Sears (1986) has suggested that college students 
are distinct in important ways from other populations—students are more compliant, 
readily change their attitudes, and often behave inconsistent with them. Furthermore, 
college students are probably also less likely to own energy-consuming houses, drive 
vehicles that emit substantial levels of greenhouse gases, or have children to shuffle 
from location to location, than are other populations. Given that college students are 
distinct in these ways, it is plausible that collective emotions would be less likely to 
motivate attitude and behavior change in other populations, those that may contribute 
more to global warming. Although generalizability is beyond the theoretical purpose 
of the present research—to examine collective guilt for future harm—this issue has 
noteworthy practical consequences.   
Future Directions for Collective Guilt Research 
Social Identity 
 Future research on collective guilt for future harm should more closely 
examine the role of social identity salience. There are two ways to approach this task. 
The first would be to examine the role of group identification. According to self-
categorization theory, those who are more highly-identified with a particular social 
group will be more likely to self-categorize as members of the group. This suggests 
that highly-identified group members should be more likely to experience collective 
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guilt. Nonetheless, this prediction does not necessarily hold. Ingroup members have 
access to a wide variety of strategies for legitimizing their group’s behavior. This is 
likely to be particularly true for the social practices that are central to everyday life as 
an ingroup member. Accordingly, future research on collective guilt for future harm 
should examine the role of group identification in generating such guilt with this issue 
in mind. It is possible that this role will be different for ingroup harm than it is for the 
instances of outgroup harm examined in previous research (Branscombe, 2004).  
 The second way to approach this task is to manipulate personal versus social 
identity salience. In the present studies, social identity salience was maintained by 
mentioning “American” throughout the text. However, it would be interesting to see 
whether collective guilt responses would be as strong when personal identity was 
salient, rather than social identity. It is likely that collective guilt would differ for 
many reasons. One reason is that collective emotions are premised on a salient social 
identity; shifting the relative balance of salience to personal identity should diminish 
the potential for collective guilt. Another reason is that a salient personal identity 
should make personal identity concerns more salient than social identity concerns, 
thereby diminishing the relevance of harms to future group members. This should 
diminish collective guilt. Any examination of personal and social identity must be 
mindful of the possibility that personal and social identity might interact in many 
important ways (Postmes & Jetten, 2006; Reynolds & Turner, 2006).  
Future research on collective guilt for future harm should also more closely 
examine the role of intragroup dynamics. As mentioned earlier, it is plausible that 
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people could experience collective guilt for harm that ingroup members are likely to 
inflict in the future. This possibility is particularly likely because social norms shift 
across time—in order to justify changing social practices (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & 
O’Brien, 2002; Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Newcomb, 1957). From the perspective of 
present-day social norms, future ingroup actions might seem quite harmful. Imagine 
how colonial Americans would evaluate present-day beliefs about religion or social 
equality. A similar situation might occur for some present-day Americans if future 
Americans were to overwhelmingly support a constitutional amendment legalizing 
gay marriage. It is possible that linking present and future Americans via a shared 
social identity could elicit collective guilt for the harms that future group members 
will perpetuate, as the groups are likely hold different standards for legitimization.  
Furthermore, it seems plausible that future ingroup members might assign 
collective guilt to present-day ingroup members for behaviors that harm the future. 
For instance, future Americans might assign collective guilt to present Americans for 
the negative consequences of global warming. It would be interesting to see whether 
the salience of this possibility would elicit collective guilt or change motivation for 
engaging in green practices. These considerations are consistent with research on 
intergenerational justice, which examines conflicts of interests between different 
ingroup generations (Barry, 1999; Wade-Benzoni, Hernandez, Medvec, & Messick, 
2008). These considerations are also consistent with research on collective guilt 
assignment, which addresses how harm-doers respond to calls for responsibility from 
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their victims (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Such calls would seem more convincing 
when coming from other ingroup members (Turner, 1991). 
Future research on collective guilt for future harm should also more closely 
examine the role of intergroup dynamics. There are two ways to address this issue. 
One way is to focus on the cause of global warming and its harmful consequences. 
For instance, ingroup members might hold a higher standard for evidence that proves 
global warming is actually occurring or poses an important risk, when focusing on 
ingroup greenhouse gas emissions than when focusing on outgroup emissions. 
Consequently, the higher standard mitigates collective guilt. This view is consistent 
with research on shifting standards of justice, which shows that ingroups require 
greater evidence to confirm ingroup injustice when the victimized group is seen as an 
outgroup than when they are seen as an ingroup (Miron & Branscombe, 2008; Miron, 
Branscombe, & Biernat, 2008). The standards for deciding whether global warming 
exists and poses a real threat are within-group standards that shift with salience of 
group interests (Turner, 1991).  
Additionally, ingroup members might be more likely to see greenhouse gas 
emissions as illegitimate when focusing on an outgroup’s emissions than when 
focusing on the ingroup’s emissions. When focusing on an outgroup’s emissions, 
ingroup members might denounce the behavior of the outgroup, but feel reduced 
collective guilt for ingroup greenhouse gas emissions. However, when focusing on 
ingroup emissions, members might diffuse ingroup responsibility by suggesting that 
ingroup members cannot reduce global warming without the help of the outgroup, 
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thus undermining collective guilt for ingroup inaction. But, ingroup members might 
feel more collective guilt if the outgroup was taking effective steps to reduce global 
warming, whereas the ingroup was not. Therefore, an outgroup might be a useful tool 
in dispelling collective guilt—via legitimizing present ingroup practices—unless the 
outgroup behaved otherwise.  
The second way to examine the role of intergroup dynamics would be to focus 
on the harmful consequences of global warming. For instance, ingroup greenhouse 
gas emissions might be seen as more legitimate when global warming is likely to 
harm an outgroup in the future than when it is likely to harm the ingroup. This might 
be true for Americans who believed that global warming would harm only distant 
islanders, such as Indonesians. This would reduce collective guilt. However, if they 
believed that global warming was likely to harm Hawaiians, then ingroup emissions 
might be seen as less legitimate and thereby elicit collective guilt. Additionally, if 
Americans categorized Indonesians within a superordinate human category, then they 
might also see their greenhouse emissions as illegitimate and feel collective guilt.  
Furthermore, the perceived efficacy of strategies to reduce global warming 
might depend on who is likely to be harmed by global warming in the future. For 
instance, if the outgroup is likely to be harmed by global warming, then everyday 
strategies to reduce global warming might be perceived as less effective at reducing 
global warming than if the ingroup is likely to be harmed by global warming. So long 
as ingroup interests are protected from global warming, then there is little reason for 
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changing present-day behavior related to greenhouse gas emissions. However, when 
ingroup interests are shaken by global warming, then there is more need for change.  
Collective Emotion 
 Several suggestions have been made about collective emotions that warrant 
further examination. One suggestion is that emotions other than collective guilt might 
play a role in motivating reductions in global warming. This research examined 
collective anxiety, but not in depth. Other emotions might also play a role, including 
collective pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007a) or collective resentment (Iyer, Schamder, & 
Lickel, 2007). Another suggestion is that collective guilt and collective anxiety are 
promotion- and prevention-focused emotions, respectively. The role of regulatory-
focus in collective emotions is consistent with research addressing the regulatory 
implications of collective emotions (Maitner et al., 2007; Smith & Mackie, 2008).   
 Furthermore, future research might examine the role of temporal distance in 
the experience of collective emotions. According to construal level theory (Liberman 
et al., 2007), temporally distant events should be represented in an abstract manner, 
whereas temporally close events should be represented in a detailed manner. It could 
be that reducing the temporal distance of the harm done by global warming increases 
the detail that people use in understanding the harm. Thus, when global warming will 
harm the ingroup in 20 years, people graphically portray the damage and suffering of 
other ingroup members. However, when global warming will harm the ingroup in 50 
years, people have only a vague idea about the harm that global warming will cause. 
Different representations of the harm done by global warming could have important 
 91
implications for collective emotions, such as which emotions are more prominent in 
motivating pro-environmental behavior. For instance, collective anxiety might elicit 
more pro-environmental behavior when the harm from global warming is coming in 
the near future, rather than when it is far off in the distant future. Future research is 
well-advised to consider this possibility.  
 Another important avenue for collective emotions research would be to create 
a coherent account of collective emotion regulation. Although research on personal 
emotion regulation is well-developed (Gross, 2007), research on collective emotion 
regulation has a rather piecemeal character. From a self-categorization view, people 
will engage in collective emotion regulation to manage the positivity of their social 
identity. The impetus at the heart of threats to social identity is indeed likely to be 
collective emotion. A close examination of research on strategies to manage social 
identity might reveal strategies that regulate collective emotion (Branscombe et al., 
1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For instance, it is 
conceivable that social mobility (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) regulates collective guilt, 
whereas social promotion (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 
1976) regulates collective pride. With a clearer perspective on collective emotion 
regulation, researchers will have a richer view on intergroup relations, buttressed 
from the unfortunate misnomer that social identity is primarily a cognitive notion 
(Haslam et al., in press; Turner & Reynolds, 2001).  
 However, developing a coherent account of collective emotion regulation will 
undoubtedly be a complex undertaking. One possible way to organize the account is 
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to focus on the distinction between strategies that are mostly stability-oriented, and 
strategies that are mostly change-oriented. Research on personal emotion regulation 
will be instructive. For instance, many strategies that people use to regulate emotion 
seem geared toward maintaining the stability of their present situation. For instance, 
several researchers have discussed justification and its role in preserving the status 
quo (e.g., Freud, 1937; Festinger, 1957; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Moreover, 
several researchers have discussed cognitive reappraisal and its role in promoting 
important change (e.g., Guiliani & Gross, in press; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; 
Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008). Accordingly, it appears possible that strategies for 
regulating emotion reflect deeper motivations for promoting or preventing change 
(Molden et al., 2008).  
 Assuming that such motivations also underlie collective emotion regulation 
strategies, it appears plausible that different collective emotions shape the selection of 
emotion regulation strategies. For instance, should collective guilt entail promotion-
focused motivation, then people who feel collective guilt would be more likely to 
select strategies aimed at ingroup change. This seems consistent with work showing 
that collective guilt leads to changes in attitudes toward victimized groups (Powell et 
al., 2005). Conversely, if collective anxiety entails prevention-focused motivation, 
then people who feel collective anxiety would be more likely to select strategies 
aimed at ingroup stability. Although little research exists on which emotion regulation 
strategies will be chosen in a particular situation (Gross, 2007), it seems reasonable 
that which emotion is operating will play a prime role in the selection.  
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Reducing Global Warming 
 Future research focused on reducing global warming could focus on the way 
that communications about global warming are framed (Moser & Dilling, 2006). For 
instance, framing inequalities as White privilege, rather than Black disadvantage, 
lowers modern racism among White-Americans (Powell et al., 2005). Similarly, 
framing reductions of global warming in terms of future ingroup gains rather than 
present ingroup losses, should elicit greater willingness to help reduce global 
warming. In addition, when primed with promotion-focused motivation, people 
should be more willing to help reduce global warming when such behaviors are 
framed as promoting ingroup change, than they are framed as preventing ingroup 
instability. Framing the desired action in terms of predominate motivations should 
promote greater willingness to engage in behaviors that reduce global warming (e.g., 
Wohl & Branscombe, 2008a).  
 Another potential avenue for future research would be to closely examine how 
self-categorization impacts environmentally-relevant attitudes and values. In attitude-
behavior consistency models, these attitudes and values are seen as key motivators of 
action related to the environment. However, these models do not explain the sources 
of the attitudes. Self-categorization research suggests that shifts in self-categorization 
will produce corresponding shifts in environmentally-relevant attitudes toward group 
norms (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007; Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; 
Reynolds & Turner, 2006; Schmitt, Lehmiller, & Walsh, 2007; see also Mischel, 
2004 on the contextual sources of stability for internal psychological constructs).  
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For example, research has shown that political liberalism is related to stronger 
pro-environmental attitudes (Gifford, 2007; Oskamp & Schultz, 2005). It has likewise 
shown that Black-Americans are more likely to hold stronger liberal attitudes than 
White-Americans, and women are more likely to hold stronger liberal attitudes than 
males. Therefore, self-categorization theory would suggest that Black males who self-
categorize as Black would express stronger liberal attitudes than Black males who 
self-categorize as male. If so, then it is possible that self-categorizing as Black might 
elicit stronger pro-environmental attitudes and behavior. This seems consistent with 
research proposing that attitudes are not inherently fixed causes, but rather that they 
are contextually malleable effects (e.g., Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Tesser, 1978; 
Wade-Benzoni, Li, Thompson, & Bazerman, 2007).  
Conclusion 
 Global warming is one of the most significant social concerns of our present 
times (Oskamp, 2007). Like our predecessors who contributed to the improvement of 
intergroup relations, present-day researchers are well-positioned to contribute to the 
reduction of global warming by understanding its underlying social psychology. As 
with any human-derived problem, global warming has a human dimension that our 
discipline can illuminate, lending support to broader efforts to find solutions. The 
present research on collective guilt for future ingroup harm is a small step in this 
direction. Future researchers have an opportunity to contribute to the reduction of 
global warming for future generations.  
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Appendix A 
 
Scientific Information about Global Warming 
 
 
Levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere have 
increased about 70% in recent decades. The vast majority of scientists agree that this 
increase is largely caused by emissions released during the burning of fossil fuels 
(such as gasoline, coal, and natural gas). The United States currently releases more 
emissions than any other country in the world—and the most emissions per person.  
 
High levels of greenhouse gases inside the Earth’s atmosphere trap sunlight from 
space, causing increasingly warmer air and ocean temperatures. This process is called 
global warming. Warmer temperatures can affect people and nature in many ways, 
such as—increased extreme weather events (such as storms, heat waves, drought), 
increased food and water shortages, increased flooding of coastal and river areas 
(where people work and live), increased pest infestations and disease, and extinction 
of many plant and animal species. Such impacts of global warming are likely to 
intensify as the Earth’s temperatures continue to rise over time. Further greenhouse 
gas emissions will likely accelerate global warming and its impacts.  
 
Based on the available scientific evidence, Americans in the future are likely to be 
confronted by the impacts of global warming during their lifetimes. Studies suggest 
that Americans’ efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the next several 
years could reduce at least some of the impacts of global warming on the lives of 
Americans in the future.  
 
 
Note. Information presented in Studies 1-2.  
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Appendix B 
 
Manipulated Information about Global Warming 
 
 
All conditions 
 
Scientists have long had substantial evidence that the buildup of greenhouse gases in 
the Earth’s atmosphere produces warmer air and ocean temperatures, a process 
known as global warming. However, scientists have had less evidence about the 
causes of global warming and its possible impacts on the United States. Recently, 
scientists from Kansas University’s Climate Research Institute (CRI) completed a 
landmark study examining these issues.  
 
Minor impact/natural cause condition 
 
Using the most advanced climatological technologies available, the CRI study 
provided strong evidence that global warming is primarily caused by natural 
processes, such as increases in solar and volcanic activity. Further, the CRI study 
provided strong evidence that global warming will have only a minor impact on the 
United States in the future, confined mostly to occasional hot days or some localized 
flooding. According to top experts, the CRI results are a substantial contribution to 
climate science and will play an important role in social and political discussions on 
global warming. 
 
Minor impact/human cause condition 
 
Using the most advanced climatological technologies available, the CRI study 
provided strong evidence that global warming is primarily caused by human 
activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels and the consumption of electricity. 
Further, the CRI study provided strong evidence that global warming will have only a 
minor impact on the United States in the future, confined mostly to occasional hot 
days or some localized flooding. According to top experts, the CRI results are a 
substantial contribution to climate science and will likely play a key role in social and 
political discussions about global warming.  
 
continued 
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Major impact/natural cause condition 
 
Using the most advanced climatological technologies available, the CRI study 
provided strong evidence that global warming is primarily caused by natural 
processes, such as increases in solar and volcanic activity. Further, the CRI study 
provided strong evidence that global warming will have a major impact on the United 
States in the future, due mostly to flooding, drought, or disease. According to top 
experts, the CRI results are a substantial contribution to climate science and will play 
an important role in social and political discussions on global warming. 
 
Major impact/human cause condition 
 
Using the most advanced climatological technologies available, the CRI study 
provided strong evidence that global warming is primarily caused by human 
activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels and the consumption of electricity. 
Further, the CRI study provided strong evidence that global warming will have a 
major impact on the United States in the future, due mostly to flooding, drought, or 
disease. According to top experts, the CRI results are a substantial contribution to 
climate science and will play an important role in social and political discussions on 
global warming. 
 
 
Note. Information presented in Study 3.  
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Appendix C 
 
Legitimization Measures 
 
 
Harm Likelihood (Studies 1-2)  
 
What is the likelihood that global warming will cause distress for Americans 
in the future?  
What is the likelihood that global warming will disrupt the lives of Americans 
in the future?  
What is the likelihood that global warming will make life harder for 
Americans in the future?  
What is the likelihood that global warming will lead to suffering for 
Americans in the future?   
What is the likelihood that global warming will cause harm to Americans in 
the future?  
What is the likelihood that global warming will threaten the well-being of 
Americans in the future?  
 
Harm Severity (Study 3)  
 
How much suffering do you think global warming will cause for Americans in 
the future?  
How much harm do you think global warming will cause to Americans in the 
future?   
How much damage do you think global warming will cause for Americans in 
the future?   
 
Collective Efficacy (Studies 2-3) 
 
To what extent do you believe that if Americans today worked together, then 
they could reduce the impact of global warming on Americans in the future?  
To what extent do you believe that if Americans today cooperated with each 
other, then they could reduce the impact of global warming on Americans in the 
future? 
To what extent do you believe that if Americans today worked as a team, then 
they could reduce the impact of global warming on Americans in the future?* 
To what extent do you believe that if Americans today combined forces, then 
they could reduce the impact of global warming on Americans in the future?  
 
continued 
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Collective Responsibility (Studies 2-3) 
 
To what extent do you believe that Americans today are largely responsible 
for the effects of global warming?  
To what extent do you believe that Americans today are largely to blame for 
the effects of global warming?  
To what extent do you believe that Americans today are largely at fault for the 
effects of global warming?  
 
Collective Legitimacy (Studies 2-3)  
 
To what extent do you believe it is wrong that Americans today contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming electricity, and in 
other ways)?  
To what extent do you believe it is unacceptable that Americans today 
contribute to greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming 
electricity, and in other ways)?  
To what extent do you believe it is not okay that Americans today contribute 
to greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming electricity, and in 
other ways)?  
 
 
Note. Item marked with an asterisk did not appear in Study 3.  
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Appendix D 
 
Collective Emotion Measures 
 
 
Collective Guilt (Study 1)  
 
To what extent do you, as an American, feel guilty for your contributions to 
global warming?  
To what extent do you, as an American, feel regretful for your contributions to 
global warming?  
To what extent do you, as an American, feel remorseful for your contributions 
to global warming?  
To what extent do you, as an American, feel apologetic for your contributions 
to global warming?* 
 
Collective Guilt (Studies 2-3)  
 
To what extent do you feel guilty that Americans today contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming electricity, and in 
other ways)?  
To what extent do you feel regretful that Americans today contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming electricity, and in 
other ways)?   
To what extent do you feel remorseful that Americans today contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming electricity, and in 
other ways)?   
To what extent do you feel apologetic that Americans today contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions (by driving automobiles, consuming electricity, and in 
other ways)?*  
 
Collective Anxiety (Studies 1-3)   
 
To what extent do you feel nervous about the impact of global warming on 
Americans in the future?  
To what extent do you feel worried about the impact of global warming on 
Americans in the future?  
To what extent do you feel concerned about the impact of global warming on 
Americans in the future?* 
To what extent do you feel apprehensive about the impact of global warming 
on Americans in the future?  
 
 
Note. Items marked with an asterisk did not appear in Study 3.  
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Appendix E 
 
Green Practices Measures 
 
 
Vehicle Emissions (Studies 1-2) 
  
To what extent would you be willing to increase the number of times that you 
carpool with friends or coworkers (vs. drive) each week? 
To what extent would you be willing to increase the number of times that you 
use public transportation (vs. drive) each week, such as buses or commuter trains? 
To what extent would you be willing to increase the number of times that you 
ride a bicycle (vs. drive) each week? 
To what extent would you be willing to increase the number of times that you 
walk (vs. drive) each week? 
To what extent would you be willing to reduce the number of miles that you 
drive each week by going to fewer places or combining trips? 
To what extent would you be willing to consider obtaining a more fuel 
efficient vehicle, such as a hybrid (gasoline and electric) vehicle? 
 
Energy Conservation (Studies 1-2)  
 
To what extent would you be willing to adjust the thermostat in your 
residence so that it is a little warmer than you like it in the summer? 
To what extent would you be willing to adjust the temperature in your 
residence so that it is a little cooler than you like it in the winter? 
To what extent would you be willing to move into a residence that has less 
square footage than your present residence? 
To what extent would you be willing to decrease the amount of time that you 
use products requiring electricity or batteries each week? 
To what extent would you be willing to replace your regular light bulbs with 
energy-efficient compact fluorescent light bulbs (these are more expensive)? 
To what extent would you be willing to adjust the lighting in your residence 
so that it is a little darker than you like it at night? 
To what extent would you be willing to unplug household appliances and 
electronics with electric indicator lights or clocks when not in use? 
To what extent would you be willing to decrease the amount of water that you 
use during baths and showers? 
To what extent would you be willing to allow the temperate of your showers 
to be a little colder than you like them? 
To what extent would you be willing to decrease the amount of time that you 
leave the water running when you shave or brush your teeth? 
 
continued 
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Green Household Practices (Study 1)  
 
To what extent would you be willing to purchase more products made with 
recycled materials (such as paper or plastic)? 
To what extent would you be willing to increase the frequency with which 
you recycle paper, glass, plastic, aluminum, and steel products? 
To what extent would you be willing to minimize the amount of solid waste 
that you produce by using reusable products rather than disposable products (such as 
cups or napkins)? 
To what extent would you be willing to be more minimalist by purchasing 
fewer products in general? 
To what extent would you be willing to purchase more of your food products 
from local sources (such as Farmer’s markets)?  
To what extent would you be willing to purchase your own canvas grocery 
bags to use in place of the plastic bags provided by grocery stores? 
To what extent would you be willing to reduce your consumption of meat and 
dairy products? 
 
Environmental Taxes (Studies 1-3) 
 
To what extent would you be willing to support a $50 per year federal income 
tax increase, designed to support scientific research on ways to reduce global 
warming?  
To what extent would you be willing to support a $15 per month electricity 
tax, designed to encourage people to use less electricity? 
To what extent would you be willing to support a $300 per year increase in 
property taxes for homes that fail to meet minimum energy efficiency standards, 
designed to promote energy efficient maintenance and construction?* 
To what extent would you be willing to support a 20¢ per gallon gasoline tax, 
designed to encourage people to use less gasoline or obtain more fuel efficient 
vehicles? 
To what extent would you be willing to support a $500 per unit tax on people 
who purchase vehicles that fail to meet minimum fuel efficiency standards, designed 
to promote the purchase of fuel efficient vehicles?* 
To what extent would you be willing to support a 2¢ per mile annual pollution 
tax for every mile that a person drives, designed to reduce the number of miles that 
people drive?* 
 
continued 
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Environmental Advocacy (Studies 1-2)  
 
To what extent would you be willing to learn more about global warming 
through reading, watching television, or surfing the internet? 
To what extent would you be willing to add your name and email to the online 
global warming march? 
To what extent would you be willing to encourage your family and friends to 
watch a documentary on global warming?  
To what extent would you be willing to encourage your family and friends to 
reduce greenhouse gases and energy consumption? 
To what extent would you be willing to join a student group on campus that 
promotes greater awareness of global warming? 
To what extent would you be willing to give a short presentation in an 
elementary school about global warming and how to reduce it? 
To what extent would you be willing to sign a petition encouraging the 
university to install solar panels on major buildings on campus, even if this would 
raise student fees by $30 per semester? 
To what extent would you be willing to attend a peaceful campus 
demonstration to encourage the university to obtain at least 25% of their energy from 
renewable sources (such as wind or solar power), even if this would raise student fees 
by $50 per semester? 
To what extent would you be willing to stop purchasing products from 
manufacturers or retailers that have poor environmental records? 
To what extent would you be willing to make a $40 tax-deductible donation to 
environmental groups, who lobby politicians to reduce people’s contributions to 
global warming? 
To what extent would you be willing to send an email to government officials 
to encourage them to support policies that reduce global warming? 
To what extent would you be willing to vote against politicians with a poor 
record of helping to protect citizens from global warming? 
 
 
Note. Items marked with an asterisk did not appear in Study 3.  
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Appendix F 
 
Debriefing Information Sheet 
 
 
Thank you for completing the survey.  
 
This research examines how people’s beliefs about global warming influences their 
feelings and willingness to help reduce global warming. In the passage that you read, 
the information about causes of global warming and extent of its impact on the United 
States was varied, based on common perspectives in society. The survey said that this 
information came from a climate center on campus, but this center does not exist, nor 
are the researchers in this study experts on the causes and impacts of global warming. 
The researchers apologize for not telling you this earlier, but they needed people to 
think that the information about global warming was real, to see whether it would 
impact their feelings or willingness to help.  
 
At this point, the study is over. If you would prefer to keep your survey, then you may 
do so. This would withdraw you from the study and the researchers could not use 
your responses in their analyses. If you would like to withdraw, then please take your 
survey with you when you leave. If you would not like to withdraw, then please give 
your booklet to the research assistant.  
 
Whatever you choose, the researchers appreciate your time and effort. Thank you. 
 
 
Note. This information was used in Study 3.  
 118
Appendix G 
 
Correlations for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions,  
and Green Attitudes and Practices in Study 1 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm  ---       
        
2. Guilt .65*** ---      
        
3. Anxiety .77*** .69*** ---     
        
4. Emissions .40*** .47*** .36*** ---    
        
5. Energy .48*** .52*** .51*** .57*** ---   
        
6. Household  .46*** .47*** .39*** .59*** .76*** ---  
        
7. Taxes .34** .46*** .45*** .42*** .58*** .52*** --- 
        
8. Advocacy .46*** .56*** .55*** .61*** .73*** .65*** .70*** 
        
9. Attitudes .57*** .67*** .58*** .59*** .61*** .63*** .49*** 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
continued 
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________________________ 
 
    Measure 8 
________________________ 
 
1. Harm   
  
2. Guilt  
  
3. Anxiety  
  
4. Emissions  
  
5. Energy  
  
6. Household   
  
7. Taxes  
  
8. Advocacy --- 
  
9. Attitudes .71*** 
________________________ 
 
 120
Appendix H 
 
Correlations for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green  
Attitudes and Practices within Stability Condition in Study 2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm  ---       
        
2. Efficacy .48** ---      
        
3. Illegitimacy .47** .37* ---     
        
4. Responsibility .65*** .64*** .68*** ---    
        
5. Guilt .63*** .56*** .61*** .59*** ---   
        
6. Anxiety .69*** .56*** .50** .63*** .78*** ---  
        
7. Emissions .35* .51*** .37* .33* .57*** .52*** --- 
        
8. Energy .31* .56*** .55*** .47** .62*** .43** .82*** 
        
9. Household  .32* .55*** .55*** .43** .57*** .51*** .85*** 
        
10. Taxes .22 .36* .27 .44** .39** .36* .55*** 
        
11. Advocacy .52*** .61*** .45** .57*** .64*** .64*** .78*** 
        
12. Attitudes .51*** .51*** .47** .57*** .69*** .71*** .66*** 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
continued 
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________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 8 9 10 11 
________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm      
     
2. Efficacy     
     
3. Legitimacy     
     
4. Responsibility     
     
5. Guilt     
     
6. Anxiety     
     
7. Emissions     
     
8. Energy ---    
     
9. Household  .89*** ---   
     
10. Taxes .61*** .60*** ---  
     
11. Advocacy .73*** .76*** .74*** --- 
     
12. Attitudes .59*** .58*** .57*** .73*** 
________________________________________________ 
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Appendix I 
 
Correlations for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green  
SAttitudes and Practices within Change Condition in Study 2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm  ---       
        
2. Efficacy .41*** ---      
        
3. Illegitimacy .64*** .64*** ---     
        
4. Responsibility .56*** .62*** .57*** ---    
        
5. Guilt .48*** .64*** .66*** .68*** ---   
        
6. Anxiety .66*** .58*** .65*** .63*** .68*** ---  
        
7. Emissions .48*** .42*** .54*** .26* .36** .47*** --- 
        
8. Energy .48*** .33** .56*** .29** .43*** .56*** .70*** 
        
9. Household  .44*** .41*** .53*** .37** .48*** .62*** .66*** 
        
10. Taxes .51*** .51*** .65*** .56*** .57*** .55*** .50*** 
        
11. Advocacy .58*** .59*** .62*** .55*** .62*** .75*** .53*** 
        
12. Attitudes .57*** .52*** .62*** .44** .59*** .69*** .61*** 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
continued 
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________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 8 9 10 11 
________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm      
     
2. Efficacy     
     
3. Legitimacy     
     
4. Responsibility     
     
5. Guilt     
     
6. Anxiety     
     
7. Emissions     
     
8. Energy ---    
     
9. Household  .78*** ---   
     
10. Taxes .59*** .58*** ---  
     
11. Advocacy .62*** .69*** .76*** --- 
     
12. Attitudes .69*** .67*** .64*** .75*** 
________________________________________________ 
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Appendix J 
 
Correlations for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green Attitudes  
and Practices within Nature/Minor Condition in Study 3 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm  ---       
        
2. Efficacy .54* ---      
        
3. Illegitimacy .56* .62** ---     
        
4. Responsibility .70** .31 .57* ---    
        
5. Guilt .63** .71** .76*** .50* ---   
        
6. Anxiety .46 .65** .73** .30 .88*** ---  
        
7. Taxes .65** .54* .43 .64** .59* .37 --- 
        
8. Liberalism .66** .74** .70** .47 .62** .53* .59* 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Appendix K 
 
Correlations for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green Attitudes  
and Practices within Nature/Major Condition in Study 3 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm  ---       
        
2. Efficacy .04 ---      
        
3. Illegitimacy .19 .27 ---     
        
4. Responsibility .20 .42* .57** ---    
        
5. Guilt .36 .13 .73*** .70*** ---   
        
6. Anxiety .58** .35 .16 .16 .23 ---  
        
7. Taxes .40 .43* .61** .50* .50* .16 --- 
        
8. Liberalism .10 .29 .15 .47* .22 -.01 .22 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Appendix L 
 
Correlations for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green Attitudes  
and Practices within Human/Minor Condition in Study 3 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm  ---       
        
2. Efficacy .51* ---      
        
3. Illegitimacy -.20 .17 ---     
        
4. Responsibility .43 .09 .09 ---    
        
5. Guilt .48* .55* .46 .47 ---   
        
6. Anxiety .13 .33 -.21 .21 .21 ---  
        
7. Taxes .29 .56* .15 .23 .44 .40 --- 
        
8. Liberalism .57* .04 -.20 .22 .25 .06 .12 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Appendix M 
 
Correlations for Legitimizations, Collective Emotions, and Green Attitudes  
and Practices within Human/Major Condition in Study 3 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Harm  ---       
        
2. Efficacy .08 ---      
        
3. Illegitimacy .61** .24 ---     
        
4. Responsibility .07 .43 .30 ---    
        
5. Guilt .75*** .20 .68** .06 ---   
        
6. Anxiety .81*** .29 .56* .06 .74*** ---  
        
7. Taxes .60** .05 .66** .24 .67** .63** --- 
        
8. Liberalism .32 .05 .51* .16 .30 .38 .50* 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
